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I. INTRODUCTION
Lying in the shadow of contract law are unifying principles for calculating
damages. These principles integrate the purposes motivating rules formalized in
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts2 (Restatement) and their computational methods. Neither the U.C.C.
nor the Restatement rules reflect these principles in any way that is apparent on their
face. On the contrary, for each type of contract breach, the damage rules in Article
2 of the U.C.C. offer apparently distinct formulas, the applications of which depend
on whether the non-breaching party was a buyer or seller, obtained partial
performance, or arranged a substitute performance. The Restatement offers
different formulas depending on the unhelpful and ultimately irrelevant distinction
between the expectation and reliance interests. The Shadow Code offers an
approach to contract damage calculations that explicitly reflects the well-recognized
compensatory goal.
The Shadow Code restates the law of damages in a single section applicable to
all breaches of contract. That section is based on the notion that people contract in
order to improve their well-being. Each party ordinarily hopes for some
improvement, or "surplus" of benefits over costs, as a result of contracting. The
principle that a party injured by another's breach is entitled to be put in the position
he or she would have occupied had the other performed as promised is not novel,
but lies at the heart of the U.C.C. and the Restatement. The surplus-based
approach to damages recognizes an injured party's entitlement to the difference
between the surplus he or she would have realized had the other performed as
promised and the actual surplus obtained. Section 1 of The Shadow Code
articulates this central principle that applies to all types of parties-whether
1. U.C.C. §§ 2-702-2-715 (2002).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347-349 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
3. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (2002) ("The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party
had fully performed...") and RESTATEMENT § 347 cmt. a (1981) ("Contract damages are ordinarily
based on the injured party's expectation interest and are intended to give him the benefit of his bargain
by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put him in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed.").
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THE SHADOW CODE
consumers or merchants, buyers or sellers-who are injured in all types of partial
and total contract breaches.
The surplus-based approach requires no inventive types of information. While
reflecting a consideration of costs and benefits, the surplus-based approach alters
neither the philosophic orientation of damages rules nor the bottom line amount of
damages awarded. The Shadow Code yields damages awards mathematically
equivalent to both U.C.C. Article 2 and the Restatement.
The Shadow Code reveals goals of legal remedies for breach of contract that
have long been buried in the details of the U.C.C. and the Restatement and for that
reason, reveals the intuition behind both of them. The key to the surplus-based
approach is distinguishing between "anticipated surplus," the improvement in well-
being (potentially negative for a losing contract) the injured party would have
realized had the other performed as promised, and "actual surplus," the
improvement in well-being (often negative) resulting from the breach. The Shadow
Code follows its basic principle of Section 1 ["SC § 1"] with only two explanatory
sections, Sections 2 ["SC § 2"] and 3 ["SC § 3"], defining, respectively, anticipated
and actual surplus. The principle of lost surplus relies on a comparison of the
benefits and costs of contracting and recognizes as broad a definition of benefits as
the Restatement of Restitution, which states that "[a] person confers a benefit upon
another if he... in any way adds to the other's security or advantage."4 Costs may
similarly be defined as subtracting from the other's security or advantage. The
comments and illustrations to SC § 2 and SC § 3 of The Shadow Code display the
broad range of costs and benefits relevant to calculating lost surplus. With its
general principle in SC § 1 and explanations in SC § 2 and SC § 3, The Shadow
Code draws together hugely disparate rules. The Shadow Code spares future
generations of law students, lawyers, and judges the difficulty of applying different
rules for cases involving sales of goods and for other exchanges, and within the
realm of sales of goods, different rules for buyers and sellers in a multiplicity of
factual contexts.
The Shadow Code may also be used in conjunction with existing codes to
resolve difficult cases and to check the application of any of the myriad of rules
arising from the U.C.C. and Restatement. Our position is that any computation
arising from application of one of the rules in the U.C.C. or Restatement giving a
damage award that is not equal to the difference between anticipated and actual
surplus must be the result of an incorrect understanding of the U.C.C. or
Restatement, or an understanding inconsistent with the U.C.C.'s or Restatement's
4. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § I cmt. b (1937) states:
A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or
some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services
beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a debt or a duty of the other,
or in any way adds to the other's security or advantage. He confers a benefit not
only where he adds to the property of another, but also where he saves the other
from expense or loss.
2004]
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underlying goals.5 The surplus-based approach is mathematically equivalent to an
interpretation of those rules consistent with their acknowledged purposes.
Section 4 of The Shadow Code codifies generally recognized limitations on
contract damages. Section 4 ["SC § 4"] recognizes that claimed losses must not be
too speculative in either their existence or amount, that injured parties must take
reasonable steps to mitigate their losses, and that damages are limited to those that
5. Local rules and special exceptions sometimes cause the U.C.C. or common law to depart from
the principle that the injured party is entitled to be placed in the position he or she would have occupied
had the other performed and from strict equivalence with application of The Shadow Code. They are
easily accommodated in application of the surplus-based approach by imposing additional limitations
on what are cognizable losses. For instance, occasional blanket prohibitions, such as a prohibition
against recovery of subjective or psychic losses, apply "even if the limitations of unforeseeability and
certainty can be overcome." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.17, at 934
(2d ed. 1990). In the rare cases where the limitations could be overcome, the blanket prohibition would
produce a different result from that anticipated by The Shadow Code. The Shadow Code relies, in SC
§ 4, on the rules of evidence requiring proof of losses with reasonable certainty and reasonable
foreseeability to govern such cases, consistent with the approach of many courts. See, e.g., Silva v.
Albuquerque Assembly& Distrib. Freeport Warehouse Corp., 738 P.2d 513,514 (N.M. 1987) (holding
that "damages for emotional distress are not recoverable in an action for breach of an employment
contract... in the absence of a showing that the parties contemplated such damages at the time the
contract was made"); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons N.W., 606 P.2d 944, 951 (Idaho 1980) (denying
recovery to owner of logging equipment for "emotional distress" resulting from auctioneer's sale of
equipment below minimum specified price because it was "simply impossible to imagine that the
parties... contemplated that [owner] might suffer emotional distress upon its breach."). Several
exceptions exist to the rule denying recovery for emotional distress. "Some courts have looked to the
nature of the contract and made exceptions where breach was particularly likely to result in serious
emotional disturbance." FARNSWORTH, supra § 12.17, at 934. Other courts have allowed recovery
where the nature of the breach was "so reprehensible as to amount to a tort, or caused bodily harm."
Id. at 935. Recognizing these specialized rules does not alter the fundamental structure of The Shadow
Code.
A U.C.C. example of an unlikely but potential diversion of The Shadow Code's result may be
found in the May 2003 revisions to Article 2 of the U.C.C. While recognizing some sellers' ability to
recover consequential damages, the revised U.C.C. denies merchant sellers the ability to recover lost
profits from consumers beyond those arising from the breached contract. See U.C.C. § 2-710(3)
(Proposed Final Draft 2003, approved on May 13, 2003) [hereinafter REv. U.C.C.]. Under the
common law, any loss of surplus beyond that included in the contract would be recoverable only if
reasonably foreseeable (as required by SC § 4(c)). Consumers are unlikely to foresee any additional
loss of surplus anyway, so the explicit U.C.C. limitation is unlikely to make a practical difference. See
REv. U.C.C. § 2-710 cmt. 2 (noting that "[s]ellers rarely suffer compensable consequential damages.").
Similarly, The Shadow Code (in SC § 4(a) and related comments) takes the position that a party's
unreasonable failure to arrange a substitute transaction in the event of breach reduces his or her
recovery, and an aggrieved party who resells or covers may not recover greater damages based upon
market price. The common law is consistent with this approach, see RESTATEMENT § 350 cmt. b
(1981), but courts differ on treatment of such cases under the U.C.C. Some courts, based on the
U.C.C.'s literal language permitting free election of remedies, permit an injured party to choose a
market price proxy for the actual price of cover or resale even if the injured party arranged such a
substitute transaction. This permits recovery of greater damages based on the market price. The more
popular resolution of the issue, however, seems to be that the U.C.C. favors damages awards based
upon the actual substitute transaction (§ 2-706), not upon a hypothetical estimate of relief(§ 2-708(1)),
and § 2-708(l)'s market formula should only be used as an estimation of damages in cases in which
a more exact measure of the seller's expectation is not possible. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.7, at 376-83 (4th ed. 1995); Roy Ryden Anderson,
Damage Remedies Under the Emerging Article 2-An Essay Against Freedom, 34 HOuS. L. REV.
1065, 1070-71 (1997). An election of damages based on market price under the former approach might
result in recovery of a greater amount than permitted under The Shadow Code, but that is not the
dominant position of the courts.
[Vol. 56: 93
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are reasonably foreseeable. These limitations are well established in contract law.
6
The purpose of SC § 4 is to clarify ambiguities in the rules governing limitations on
recovery and describe how damages calculated using the surplus-based approach
account for these limitations.
In a companion article, we give detailed justifications for offering such an
alternative code.7 Aside from its ability to reveal what lies beneath the established
approaches and to provide a check on the accurate application of the established
rules, The Shadow Code has three types of advantages over current contract
damages rules that might be summarized as: (1) changing the jurisprudential and
methodological orientation of damages remedies to align goals with rules, (2)
refining terminology to eliminate confusion, and (3) facilitating analysis of the
incentives created by remedies.
At the most fundamental level, The Shadow Code alters the jurisprudential
perspective of the Restatement and methodology of the U.C.C. The Restatement
distinguishes between cases in which an injured party seeks only to recover out-of-
pocket expenses (the "reliance" interest) and those in which an injured party also
seeks to recover its improvement in well-being (the "expectation" interest). The
only case in which a party would choose the former, given that anticipated losses
are deducted when calculating reliance damages,9 is where the existence or extent
of any anticipated improvement cannot be proved with sufficient certainty. Well-
recognized evidentiary rules (embodied in SC § 4 and demonstrated by the
comments and illustrations therein) requiring proof of loss with reasonable certainty
address both cases without need for recognizing the "interest-based" approach.
The U.C.C. approach is to offer a different rule for each type of circumstance
in which a breach occurs. There are different rules for buyers and sellers;'0 different
rules for buyers who reject goods, who accept defective goods, or who arrange
substitute transactions when the seller breaches;" different rules for sellers who
resell and those who do not; and different rules for those who cannot collect the
purchase price.' 2 The welter of rules creates ambiguities in interpretation, wasting
6. Damages generally must be established with reasonable certainty. See FARNSWORTH, supra
note 5, § 12.15, at 922-23; RESTATEMENT § 352 (1981). Damages must also be reasonably foreseeable.
See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng.Rep.145 (1854) (holding that a party is entitled only to those
damages that: (1) may "reasonably be considered... [as] arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual
course of things," from the contract breach or (2) "may "reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach
of it."); RESTATEMENT § 351 (1981) (stating that loss may be foreseeable if it follows "(a) in the
ordinary course of events, or (b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of
events, that the party in breach had reason to know."); U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2002) (limiting a buyer's
consequential damages to those the seller "had reason to know"). Finally, damages are not recoverable
to the extent they could have been reasonably mitigated. See RESTATEMENqT § 350 (1981).
7. David W. Barnes and Deborah Zalesne, A Unifying Theory of Contract Damages, 55 SYR. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2005).
8. See RESTATEMENT § 344 (1981) (identifying goals underlying award of damages for breach
of contract).
9. RESTATEMENT § 349 (1981).
10. Damages rules applying to sellers are contained in U.C.C. §§ 2-702-2-710, while rules for
buyers appear in §§ 2-711-2-716.
11. Damages for buyers who rightfully reject goods are calculated according to a formula in
U.C.C. § 2-711, while recovery by buyers who accept defective goods is governed by § 2-714.
12. Damages for sellers who resell are treated under U.C.C. § 2-706, for those who do not resell
under § 2-708, and for sellers who cannot collect the purchase price under § 2-709.
2004]
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the time of courts.' 3 This observation is hardly new to the literature on contract
damages. Professor Peters observed that "the interrelationship between the various
remedies is often left unnecessarily obscure in Article 2; a remedy which is
permitted by one section appears to be interdicted by another; conduct apparently
harmless when viewed from the vantage of one provision is fraught with danger
when considered by another section."' 4 By clearly relating the goal of its provisions
to the language of the rules, The Shadow Code is designed to eliminate ambiguity.
In addition to a variety of different rules for different circumstances, U.C.C.
§ 2-714 allows damages to be "determined in any manner which is reasonable."
The Shadow Code offers a single rule covering all types of breach. It defines what
is reasonable. Because The Shadow Code produces an equivalent computational
result, the U.C.C. formulas may be used when availability of evidence recommends
them. The U.C.C. approach, however, conceals, while the surplus-based approach
reveals, the fundamental principle on which each rule is based: the principle that
an injured party is entitled to its lost surplus. The Shadow Code eliminates the
unnecessary multiplicity of specialized rules while preserving their availability.
Of particularly practical import, The Shadow Code eliminates conflicting
definitions of terms used in the U.C.C. and the Restatement. Perhaps most
significant is the substitution of the term "surplus" for "profit." Courts sometimes
use the word "profit" to refer to the extent to which contracting would improve a
party's well-being. Courts are often conflicted, however, in their terminology, with
great variation in use of the terms "profit," "gross profit," "net profit," and "clear
13. Numerous articles have been written about the ambiguities in Article 2's remedial provisions,
attempting to reconcile them with the remedial goal articulated in U.C.C. § 1-106(1), reproduced supra
in note 3. See, e.g., Vincent A. Coppola, U CC. Section 2- 708(2): A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, 96
DIcK. L. REv. 429 (1992) (addressing controversies arising from ambiguities in provisions of the
U.C.C. governing seller's remedies for repudiation or non-acceptance and attempting to reconcile them
with the underlying remedial purpose of the code); Anderson, supra note 5, at 1066 (arguing that the
Code's "egalitarian philosophy" of free election of remedies is "substantially undercut by the strong
compensation principle embodied in section 1-106 of the U.C.C."); Henry Gabriel, The Seller's
Election of Remedies Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Expectation Theory, 23 WAKE
FORESTL. REV. 429 (1988) (illuminating ambiguities in the Code through his argument in favor of free
election of remedies even to the extent it would permit the court to ignore an actual substitute
transaction); Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199 (1963) (discussing
ambiguities and conflicts inherent in Article 2's damage provisions); John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies
Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: An Agendafor Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 360
(1981) (highlighting the lack of uniformity among Article 2's damages sections); Robert Childres,
Buyer's Remedies: The Danger of Section 2-713, 72 NW. U. L. REv. 837 (1978) (arguing that,
contrary to the mandate of Section 1-103, Section 2-713 fails to measure actual damages); Roy Ryden
Anderson, An Overview of Buyers'Damage Remedies, 21 U.C.C. L.J. 28 (1988) (discussing opposing
interpretations of Section 2-713); David J. Leibson, Anticipatory Repudiation and Buyer's
Damages-A Look Into How the U CC. Has Changed the Common Law, 7 U.C.C. L.J. 272 (1975)
(explaining differing interpretations of Section 2-713); George I. Wallach, Anticipatory Repudiation
and the UC.C., 13 U.C.C. L.J. 48 (1980) (discussing various interpretations of Section 2-713); John
D. Clark, Comment, The Proposed Revisions to Contract-Market Damages of Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Disaster Not a Remedy, 46 EMORY L. J. 807, 809 (1997) (discussing
the "occasional manipulation of U.C.C. section 1-106 by courts to limit contract-market damages to
lost profits."); David Simon & Gerald A. Novack, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost
Profits: A Challenge to the Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1395, 1403 (1979)
(outlining various arguments in favor of contract market damages and others in favor of awarding lost
profits).
14. Peters, supra note 13, at 203.
[Vol. 56: 93
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profit."'" "Surplus" refers to the excess of benefits over costs 6 either anticipated,
in the sense that the injured party would have realized them had the other party
performed, or actual, as a measure of the state of affairs given the other party's
breach. 7 This excess is a measure of any improvement in well-being resulting from
the contract in question, including a negative improvement. In the case of a contract
for which the anticipated surplus was positive, the party would have been able to
use the surplus to, for instance, take a vacation, pay for overhead expenses that were
not incurred as a result of this contract, or invest in other ventures. Also standing
in the way of a uniform rule for contract damages is the fact that consumers do not
contract in order to derive a "profit" in the customary sense at all. Rather,
consumers, like businesses, contract in order to improve their well-being, which the
concept of "surplus" captures.
Also of practical significance is The Shadow Code's avoidance of the terms
"consequential" and "incidental" costs. The U.C.C. and Restatement differ on the
definition of "consequential losses," with the former including lost profits" and the
latter referring to personal injury and property damage.' 9 In the contract remedies
literature, beginning with an influential article by Lon Fuller and William Perdue,
incidental costs are costs incurred by a party, not because he or she was obliged by
contract to incur them, but because incurring them enhances the surplus hoped for
from the other's performance."0 It is analytically helpful to distinguish the costs of
performance ("performance costs" in The Shadow Code) from "surplus enhancing
15. The underlying goal of restoring the injured party to the position he or she would have been
in if the other had performed as promised requires that "profit" refers to the excess of benefits ("total
revenues" in the commercial context) derived from a contract over costs resulting from the contract
("variable costs"). Nevertheless, some courts refer to parties being entitled to "net" profits, which
sounds like something less than profits, but in various cases are different. In some cases, they are
greater than profits. See, e.g., Roth v. Speck, 126 A.2d 153, 155 (D.C. 1956) (describing net profits
as being total revenues less only some portion of the variable costs resulting from the contract). In other
cases, they are equal to profits. See, e.g., Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prods., Inc., 439 A.2d 314,
320, n.4 (Conn. 1981) (defining net profit to be the excess of revenues over variable and fix costs). In
yet other cases, they are less than profits. See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 676 F.2d
865 (1st Cir. 1982) (using the term "net profit" apparently to mean the difference between total
revenues associated with a contract and all costs, whether variable or overhead). While "gross profits"
must logically mean something greater than profits, such as total revenues without deduction for costs,
some courts use it to describe the difference between revenues and variable costs, id. at 867, which is
properly understood as "profits" (unmodified). Other courts use the term "clear profit," apparently
referring to the excess of revenues over variable costs and an allocated portion of overhead. See, e.g.,
Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 798-99 (3d Cir. 1967) (stating that "the price the
businessman should charge on each transaction could be thought of as that price necessary to yield a
pro rata portion of the company's fixed overhead, the direct costs associated with production, and a
'clear' profit."). State court opinions confirm this interpretation. See, e.g., Tex. Power & Light Co. v.
Barnhill, 639 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App. 1982) (referring to testimony by a contractor who said that
he "normally bid in 10% 'clear' profit; that is, profit after taxes, insurances, and hidden costs");
Messina v. Koch Indus., Inc., 267 So. 2d 221, 225 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (identifying the key issue as
whether a 10% fixed fee in the contract was "intended to be 'clear' profit or to include profit and some
or all overhead expenses").
16. "Surplus" is defined with greater specificity in SC § 1 and its comments.
17. SC §§ 2 and 3 and their comments respectively define "anticipated" and "actual" surpluses
with greater specificity.
18. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2002). Professors White and Summers' leading commercial law
treatise explains that the most common claim for consequential damages in cases involving goods never
accepted involves lost profits. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 6-5 at 324.
19. RESTATEMENT § 347 cmt. c (1981). The illustrations under § 347 Comment c all involve a
tort-like injury or damage to property resulting from a defective machine. Id. Illus. 4.
20. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 55 (1936).
2004]
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costs" (in The Shadow Code). Modem scholars have adopted Fuller and Perdue's
terminology.2' However, the usage bears no relationship to the Restatement's or the
U.C.C.'s meaning of "incidental costs," which refers to the costs a party incurs in
order to minimize the losses resulting from another's failure to perform.22 In the
comments and illustrations to The Shadow Code, costs incurred only from the other
party's breach are called "breach-related costs." The black letter of The Shadow
Code avoids distinguishing among types of costs incurred as a result of contracting
because all losses are recoverable, subject to well recognized limitations described
in SC § 4. This terminology is useful in explaining (as shown in the comments and
illustrations) the variety of expenditures that might reduce anticipated or actual
surplus.
Finally, the analytical structure of the surplus-based approach to contract
damages facilitates theoretical analysis of contract damages rules. For several
decades, scholars have attempted to derive models of legal remedies for breach of
contract in order to evaluate incentives. Over time, these models have evolved from
a very general mathematical form that was useful for analysis of incentives to make
and break promises, to rely on promises, and to mitigate losses.23 They were not
particularly subtle and failed to capture the variety of circumstances in which
contracts are breached. Unlike The Shadow Code, they were not designed to be
universally applicable tools for calculating damages. Subsequent models based the
foundation of their approaches on total benefits24 rather than on surplus, as The
Shadow Code does, or, if they focused on surplus, presented a series of formulas,
in the manner of the U.C.C., applicable to breaches of different types.25 The
universality of a complex model based on lost surplus 26 provided the foundation for
The Shadow Code. While it captured the variety of circumstances in which
contracts might be breached, it was cumbersome and unwieldy in application. The
Shadow Code presents a straightforward version of that model.
21. For recent examples, see Christopher W. Frost, Reconsidering the Reliance Interest, 44 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1361, 1365 n.27 (2000) (describing how discussing losing contracts leads to a discussion
of the important distinction between incidental and essential reliance); Paul L. Regan, Great
Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
35 (1999) (detailing the types of damages awarded under contract law); Michael T. Gibson, Reliance
Damages in the Law of Sales UnderArticle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909,
991-95 (1997) (reviewing the frequency with which courts award damages based on incidental
reliance).
22. See RESTATEMENT § 347 cmt. c (1981). Under the U.C.C., for sellers, incidental costs are
"any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the
transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale
of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach." U.C.C. § 2-710 (2002). For buyers, incidental
costs "include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody
of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach."
U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (2002).
23. See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, I I BELLJ. ECON. 466, 469,
nn.12-13 (1980).
24. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, andProperty: The Model ofPrecaution, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1985).
25. See Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 1434, 1438-42 (1985) (presenting formulas for five different circumstances in which contracts
may be breached); E. ALLAN FARNsWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG& CAROLSANGER, CONTRACTS 469-71
(6th ed. 2001) (offering a formula based on the right of a seller to recover lost profits plus net costs
incurred, reflecting the RESTATEMENT approach).
26. David W. Barnes, The Anatomy ofContract Damages and Efficient Breach Theory, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 397, 470-80 (1998).
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Analytically, the surplus-based approach requires only a comparison of the
anticipated and actual surplus:
Damage Award =
Anticipated Surplus
minus
Actual Surplus
Because each surplus is affected by anticipated and actual benefits and costs, and
because all types of costs fall under one of the headings of performance, surplus-
enhancing or breach-related, the surplus-based damages rule may be applied in
various ways. The structure of the surplus-based rule invites one to compare the
injured party's position after the breach (actual surplus) with the position that party
would have occupied following performance (anticipated surplus):
Damage Award =
(Anticipated Benefits - Anticipated Performance Costs - Anticipated Surplus-Enhancing Costs)
minus
(Actual Benefits - Actual Performance Costs - Actual Surplus-Enhancing Costs - Breach-Related Costs)
There are many variations on this formula. One of the most useful is one that
compares anticipated and actual revenues on one hand and anticipated and actual
costs on the other:
Damage Award =
(Anticipated - Actual Benefits)
minus
(Anticipated - Actual Costs).
For instance, the surplus-based rule provides that an injured party who incurred no
costs and derived no benefit from the breaching party is entitled to her lost surplus
(anticipated benefits less anticipated costs). More complicated cases involving
partial performance (some actual benefit), cover or resale (some actual benefit and
actual cost), and breaches of warranty may similarly be analyzed without
recognizing any distinction between buyers and sellers in the basic structure of the
rule. The comments and illustrations to The Shadow Code provide computations
for every category of circumstances in which contracts are breached.
II. THE SHADOW CODE WITH COMMENTS AND ILLUSTRATIONS"
A. Shadow Code § 1: General Rule for Recovery of Damages for Breach of
Contract
When another's performance does not conform to the
contract, an injured party may recover damages as measured
by that party's lost surplus, which is the difference between
anticipated surplus and actual surplus.
27. The signal "see" indicates that the facts in the illustration are roughly based on the facts in
the case cited, that the court discussed the issue presented in the illustration, and that the opinion
supports the treatment offered by The Shadow Code. The signal "see, e.g.," indicates a case with
analogous facts or analogous treatment of the issue that the comment discusses. The abbreviation "SC
§ " signifies a reference to that particular section of The Shadow Code.
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1. Comments
a. Consistency with UC.C. § 1-106
These proposed rules are to be interpreted in a manner consistent with
U.C.C. § 1-106, which requires that remedies be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other had fully
performed. The adjective "anticipated," used in The Shadow Code to modify
"surplus," "revenue," and "cost," thus refers to what would have happened had the
other fully performed. It does not refer to a result a party hoped for or projected at
the time of contracting.
b. Surplus and Lost Surplus Defined
"Surplus" is a monetized measure of the improvement in wealth or well-being
a contracting party obtains from another's performance. "Lost surplus" is a
monetized measure of the difference between the improvement in wealth or well-
being the injured party would have obtained had the other performed as promised28
and the improvement that party actually obtained from the other's nonconforming
performance, its own expenditures in relation to the contract, and its own
arrangements of substitute performance.29 For business enterprises, profits and
enhanced goodwill are often measures of improvements in well-being. For
individuals, surplus measures the improvement in well-being or satisfaction the
individual would have obtained, or did obtain, as a result of either performance or
breach. Losses are compensable only to the extent they meet the requirements of
mitigation, foreseeability, and certainty described in SC § 4.
Illustrations:
1. A contracts to sell B timber. B repudiates the contract.
Because B breaches the contract, A does not obtain profits of
$66,000, but rather, suffers a loss upon resale of
approximately $150,000. A damages award of $216,000 is
appropriate, because it is the monetized measure of the
improvement in wealth A would have obtained had B
performed less the improvement actually obtained ($0).30
2. A contracts to sell B three tanks made to B's specifications for
$64,350, which normally would have cost A $40,000 to
manufacture. A has not incurred any of the costs of
manufacturing the tanks when B repudiates the contract. A is
entitled to recover in damages the surplus A would have
obtained ($24,350) less the surplus actually obtained ($0).
That amount is sufficient to ensure that A obtains the
28. See SC § 2.
29. See SC § 3.
30. See Stanfill v. TAT (U.S.A) Corp., 709 P.2d 717 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
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monetized measure of improvement in wealth A would have
obtained had B performed.3'
3. B, a college sorority chapter, contracts for $3,612 to buy from
A, 168 custom-designed sweaters to be worn at a sorority
function the day after delivery is due. A repudiates the
contract. Subject to general limitations on recovery3 2 B is
entitled to recover in damages the surplus B would have
obtained, measured by the improvement in well-being B
would have realized, which may have been a subjective
benefit, less the actual surplus of zero.33
c. Lost Surplus with Costs Incurred
The surplus actually obtained from the other's non-conforming performance
may be negative, as in cases where the injured party incurred costs in anticipation
of the other's performance. To restore the lost surplus, courts must award sufficient
damages to compensate for that loss plus the anticipated improvement in well-
being. Failure to include both elements results in undercompensation because such
costs must be covered before any improvement in well-being can be realized.
Illustration:
4. Same as Illustration 2 except that A has already manufactured
the tanks when B repudiates the contract. If efforts to resell
the tanks or obtain value from salvage are unavailing, A is
entitled to the full contract price as damages. This measure
of damages would provide compensation to reimburse A for
costs A incurred plus an amount equal to the anticipated
improvement in wealth A would have obtained had B
performed.3"
31. See, e.g., Royal Jones & Assocs. v. First Thermal Sys., Inc., 566 So. 2d 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that seller was entitled to damages in the amount of the full contract price where
tanks were already manufactured and could not be resold at a reasonable price).
32. See SC § 4.
33. See Furlong v. Alpha Chi Omega Sorority, 657 N.E.2d 866 (Bowling Green County Mun.
Ct. 1993). Similarly, if B contracts to buy a custom-built houseboat from A for $160,000 and A
breaches, B's damages are based on the difference between anticipated and actual surplus. B's damages
are based on B's benefits and costs if A had performed compared to if A had breached. The benefits
are a monetized approximation of the well-being or satisfaction B would have obtained if B had been
a consumer or of the revenues B would have obtained if B had been a business enterprise. See Tarter
v. MonArk Boat Co., 430 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
34. Awarding lost profits plus costs incurred does not produce a windfall. Consider where A
contracts to sell specially manufactured rolling steel doors to B for $16,000 and incurs all of the costs
of performing for B, in the amount of $10,000. Where the doors have no salvage or resale value after
B's breach, an award of $16,000, the contract price ensures that A is placed in the position A would
have occupied had B performed, butA does not receive a windfall. See, e.g., Walter Balfour & Co. v.
Lizza & Sons, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 649,650-51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (awarding the aggrieved
seller of specially-manufactured rolling steel doors the contract price of$16,000 less a credit for doors
used as scrap and for money saved).
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d. Lost Surplus, Changes in Market Prices, and Windfalls
An increase in market price benefits a prudent or lucky buyer who contracted
earlier for a lower price. A fall in market price benefits a seller who earlier
contracted for a higher price. The surplus-based damages rule recognizes this
reality by putting the injured party in the same position the other's performance
would have done. The surplus-based rule focuses on the improvement in well-being
the injured party would have received. Because the injured party's recovery is
explicitly limited to the amount he or she would have obtained had the other
performed, there is no chance for the injured party to earn a windfall from the
other's payment of damages.
Illustrations:
5. A contracts to sell ten gallons of wholesale gasoline on the
retail market to B for $1.30 per gallon. A acquired the ten
gallons from a third party for $1.20 per gallon. B breaches
when the retail market price falls to $1.25 per gallon. A
resells the ten gallons of gasoline for $1.25 a gallon and seeks
damages from B. At the time performance was due, A's
surplus would have been $1. The damages award is the
difference between the anticipated surplus ($1) and the
surplus realized from the resale ($.50). An award of $.50
ensures A does not earn a windfall because it restores A's lost
surplus, and places A in the position it would have occupied
had B performed.3"
6. B contracts to buy 2,000 steers for $67 per steer from A and
to sell the steers on the retail market to C for $67.35 per steer,
which would yield a surplus of $700. A breaches when the
market price for steers increases dramatically. B seeks
damages from A. The buyer benefits from having contracted
before the change in market price. An award of $700 ensures
B does not earn a windfall because it merely restores B's lost
surplus, placing B in the position B would have occupied had
A performed. B is not undercompensated because the
contract with C limited his anticipated surplus to $700.
35. See, e.g., Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Holborn Oil Co., 547 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1989). Nor is there a windfall where A has not yet acquired the gasoline from the third party when the
wholesale price drops. Assume that at the same time the retail price drops to $1.25 per gallon, the
wholesale price drops to $1.15 per gallon. An award of its lost surplus, $1.50, ensures that A does not
earn a windfall. The damage award leaves A in the same position A would have occupied had B
performed as promised. The lost surplus is the difference between the surplus A would have earned if
A had purchased the gas on the wholesale market after the fall in wholesale price ($1.15 times ten
gallons) and sold it to B at the contract price ($1.30 times ten gallons) and the actual surplus ($0).
There is no windfall, because if A had bought at that lower price and sold at the contract price, A would
have improved its well-being by $1.50.
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Where there is no such resale contract, anticipated surplus
depends on the market resale price. 6
e. No Lost Surplus in Some Cases Involving Substitute Transactions
Under the lost surplus rule, an injured party may not enter into a substitute
transaction that is more favorable than the underlying contract and still obtain
damages from the breaching party.
Illustrations:
7. Because A is unable to perform, it breaches a contract to sell
100,000 gallons of gasoline to B for $.604 per gallon, for a
total loss to B of $60,400. The market price at the time of
breach has fallen to $.553 per gallon. If B obtains an equal or
greater surplus by cover than A's performance, B may not
also recover damages from A. No lost surplus arises because
actual surplus is greater than anticipated surplus.37
8. B breaches a contract to buy two molding machines from A
for $1,290,871 per machine. Where A resells the machines
on the market for a price of $1,398,592 each, A may not also
recover from B and thereby obtain a surplus equal to or
greater than the anticipated surplus. A has incurred no lost
surplus.38
f Lost Surplus Includes Larger Projects
The improvement in wealth or well-being of the injured party includes any
benefits that will be obtained after improving, developing, modifying, or otherwise
processing the goods. Just as a buyer for resale may recover the benefit of acting
as a jobber and recover her lost surplus, a processor of raw materials must be put
in the position he would have occupied had the other performed. Both types of
buyers are buying the goods as part of a larger project that will produce benefits in
36. See, e.g., H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, 767 F.2d437 (8th Cir. 1985) (involving a contract
for the sale of 2,000 steers for $67 per hundredweight and a court award of $1,371.83 to the aggrieved
buyer for the lost resale commission for the 603 steers that were not delivered). Nor is there a windfall
where B covers by purchasing similar steers on the retail market from a third party for $67.25. An
award of $.25 per steer, or $500, ensures thatB does not earn a windfall, because it merely restores B's
lost surplus and places B in the position it would have occupied had A performed. See, e.g., Neibert
v. Schwenn Agri-Prod. Corp., 579 N.E.2d 389, 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (awarding the difference
between the cost of cover and the contract price where an aggrieved buyer of sunflower seeds covers
so as to fill a contract with a repurchaser).
37. See, e.g., Chronister Oil Co. v. Unocal Ref. & Mktg., 34 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying
the market/contract differential where the buyer took the gasoline from its own inventory rather than
buying it on the open market). In some cases, covering at a lower price might result in recoverable
damages. If, for example, in this illustration, B had covered by buying in the open market at the lower
price, but had reasonably incurred costs of $6,000 in locating and effecting cover from a variety of
sellers, B's total cost of cover would be $55,300 plus $6,000, or $61,300. While the cover price is less
than the contract price, the costs of effecting cover result in B obtaining a surplus $900 less than
performance under the contract would have yielded. B may recover $900 in damages from A.
38. See The Colonel's, Inc. v. Cincinnati Milacron Mktg. Co., 910 F. Supp. 323,327-28 (E.D.
Mich. 1996).
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excess of the contract price. Sellers may less frequently have larger projects of
which the particular contract is a part, but comparable losses may result from
thwarted arrangements made with third parties. Damages under the surplus-based
rule must be sufficient to restore the injured buyer or seller to the position she
would have occupied had the other performed. Awarding an amount sufficient to
compensate for losses caused by the breach, including the surplus that would have
resulted from the larger project, is an appropriate way to achieve this end. The
monetized measure of the improvement in wealth or well-being the injured party
would have obtained includes both immediate gains, such as primary and secondary
profits, and future gains, such as goodwill.
Illustrations:
9. B contracts to purchase rough lumber from A for the purpose
of finishing and reselling it. Performance would have
resulted in B obtaining a surplus of $15.00 per thousand feet,
or a total of $9,133.73. A fails to deliver the agreed amount
of timber, and B is unable to cover. B may recover $9,133.73
in order to obtain the surplus B would have obtained had A
performed as promised.39
10. A contracts to sell logs to B. A specifies its need to complete
harvesting promptly in order to meet a scheduled logging
commitment to another buyer, C. B delays and then
repudiates. In addition to other losses, A is entitled to recover
damages for the loss incurred in performing the contract with
C to the extent attributable to B's delay and repudiation.
Awarding damages for this loss allows A to obtain the surplus
associated with the logging for C, which A would have
obtained had B performed as promised.4"
11. B, a gas station and mini market, contracts to purchase
unleaded blended gasoline from A. The gasoline is not
merchantable, because it damages engines. B is entitled to
recover the surplus lost from the sale of the nonconforming
gasoline (loss of primary profits); from the lost sales of other
items in its mini market during the period of time A supplied
nonconforming gasoline (loss of secondary profits); and from
39. See Jennings v. Lamb, 296 S.W.2d 828, 830-31 (Tenn. 1956) (relying on factual evidence
showing that the lost surplus was proved with reasonable certainty). Recovery of all elements of loss
is subject to the limitations in SC § 4.
40. See, e.g., Sprague v. Sumitomo Forestry Co., 709 P.2d 1200, 1205-06 (Wash. 1985) (holding
that the loss incurred from the delay was a consequential damage and thus not recoverable to an
aggrieved seller under the U.C.C. rule then in effect). Subject to the general limitations on recovery,
see SC § 4, a party may recover lost surplus due to financial inability to engage in other projects.
Consider a case where, pursuant to A's contract to sell machines to B, A takes out a loan to pay for the
raw materials necessary to build the machines. When B repudiates, A is entitled to collect, among other
things, the surplus A could have obtained from investing the post-breach interest payments A would not
have had to make if B had performed. This amount compensates A for the surplus associated with the
larger project A would have obtained had B performed as promised. See, e.g., Firwood Mfg. Co. v.
Gen. Tire, Inc., 96 F.3d 163, 170-71 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding aggrieved seller's lost use of money a
consequential damage not recoverable under the then applicable U.C.C. rule).
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the loss of future sales and reputation among customers (loss
of goodwill).41
B. Shadow Code § 2: Anticipated Surplus
An injured party's anticipated surplus is the difference
between the benefit that party would have received as a result
of the contract (anticipated revenue) and cost that party
would have incurred in relation to the contract had the
contract been fully performed (anticipated cost).
1. Comments
a. Anticipated Revenue and Cost Defined
"Anticipated revenue" equals total benefits a party would have received.42
"Anticipated cost" equals the total burdens that party would have incurred as a
result of contracting with the other had the other performed as promised. The extent
to which revenues were actually obtained or costs were actually incurred is
irrelevant to the calculation of anticipated surplus. Thus, benefits and costs
associated with substitute performances arranged by the injured party and those
associated with part or defective performance by either party are irrelevant to
anticipated surplus. For claims brought by sellers based on consumer contracts for
the sale of goods, a seller's anticipated revenue does not include benefits from
larger projects.
b. Anticipated Surplus Distinguished from Hoped-for Surplus
Anticipated revenue, costs, and surplus are measured by what would have
occurred rather than what the parties hoped would occur when they contracted.
Changes in the projected revenue or projected cost from the time of contracting to
the time of performance may change the relationship between revenues and costs
and reduce the hoped-for surplus. The measure of damages does not depend on
whether the anticipated revenue turns out to be less than the anticipated costs
because of bad judgment, change of circumstance, or any other reason. The
anticipated surplus is measured by the surplus that would have been realized had the
other performed, not by the surplus hoped for or projected at the time of contracting.
Illustrations:
1. A contracts to sell 2,000 raincoats to B, a retailer, at $40 each.
At the time of contracting, A expects the cost of manufacture
to be $15 per raincoat in materials and labor. B breaches. By
the time of performance (the time of delivery of the raincoats)
A's costs have risen to $45 per raincoat because of A's poor
management of labor and an increase in the market price of
41. See AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. At. Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990).
42. One benefit that the party realizes from performance that is not realized in breach is the lost
opportunity to enjoy the benefits immediately. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest are a measure
of damages designed to compensate the injured party for the loss of this benefit. Such losses are
generally recoverable, but are not included in The Shadow Code illustrations.
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the fabric used to manufacture the raincoats. Although A
hoped for a surplus of $25 per raincoat at the time of
contracting, A's damages attributable to B's breach are
measured according to A's anticipated surplus. A's
anticipated surplus is the surplus A would have earned if B
had performed, which would have been a loss of $5 per
raincoat.43
2. B, the buyer of raincoats at $40 each in the preceding
illustration, anticipated reselling them for $60 each. As a
result of an increase in the market price of fabric, the market
retail price of such raincoats had risen to $80 each when A's
performance was due. If A breaches, B's anticipated revenue
is measured by the amount B would have obtained had A
performed. Thus, B's anticipated revenue is $80 per raincoat
and B's anticipated surplus is $40 per raincoat, despite the
fact that B only hoped for $60 in revenues and $20 in surplus
per raincoat at the time of contracting.
c. Seller's Anticipated Surplus
For a seller, the anticipated revenue generally includes the contract price and
may also include benefits anticipated from larger projects in which the seller is
engaged" unless the seller is claiming damages from a consumer contract for the
sale of goods. For sale-of-goods cases where damages are limited in this way, the
anticipated revenue and, as a consequence, the anticipated surplus includes only the
surplus from the sale itself. For a seller, anticipated costs include all costs the seller
would have incurred to perform as promised. The definition of "anticipated" in this
section refers only to what would have happened, not what actually happened.45
Whether the expected costs in fact had been incurred or other benefits actually were
obtained is irrelevant to the calculation of anticipated costs or anticipated revenue.
For a seller who has made a profitable arrangement, the contract price will be
greater than the associated costs.
Illustrations:
3. A, a reseller of used equipment, buys a bulldozer from B for
$2,000 and contracts to sell it to C for $10,000. A's
anticipated revenue is $10,000, its anticipated costs are
$2,000, and its anticipated surplus is $8,000. A is the seller
in this illustration. A's anticipated revenue from the contract
was greater than A's associated costs, yielding a positive
anticipated surplus.46
43. See, e.g., Burberrys (Wholesale) Ltd. v. After Six Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1984) (addressing the issue of whether a proposed resale of the raincoats not delivered to the buyer
would be in good faith and commercially reasonable pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-706 and trademark
infringement rules). For the lost surplus calculation, see infra SC § 3, cmt. e, illus. 14, n.69.
44. See SC § 1, cmt. f.
45. See SC § 2, cmt. b.
46. See McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 541 S.W.2d 911 (Ark. 1976).
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4. Same as the preceding illustration except that A, the reseller,
also promises to recondition the bulldozer and deliver the
bulldozer to C. These additional performance costs of A's
would have amounted to $750, raising A's anticipated cost to
$2,750, and lowering A's anticipated surplus to $7,250. The
amount of the additional cost is relevant because that amount
reflects costs A, the reseller, would have incurred if C, the
buyer, had performed. Whether A actually incurred the
reconditioning and delivery costs before C's breach, whether
A can resell to another, and whether the bulldozer has salvage
value are irrelevant to this section.
d. Buyer's Anticipated Surplus
For a buyer, the anticipated cost generally includes the contract price and may
include surplus enhancing costs or costs of engaging in larger projects of which the
seller's performance is a part.47 Buyers' anticipated costs potentially include both
performance costs the buyer has promised the seller it will incur and costs it will
incur to enhance its surplus. For a buyer, anticipated revenue often includes the
benefits associated with using, reselling, or transforming the goods. For a buyer
who has made a profitable arrangement, the anticipated revenue will be greater than
the contract price.
Illustrations:
5. Same facts as Illustration 3, except B breaches its contract to
sell the bulldozer to A, so A is unable to resell the bulldozer
to C. A is the buyer in this illustration. The excess of A's
anticipated revenue ($10,000) over A's anticipated cost (the
$2,000 contract price) yields a positive anticipated surplus of
$8,000.48
6. B, a college sorority chapter, contracts for $3,612 to buy from
A 168 custom-designed sweaters to be worn at a sorority
function the day after delivery is due. A repudiates the
contract. Subject to general limitations on recovery, 49 B's
anticipated surplus is the monetized measure of improvement
in well-being or satisfaction B would have realized from
using the sweaters at the planned function had A performed
as promised. It is the difference between the benefits B
would have obtained and the costs B would have incurred in
relation to the sweaters had A performed. The anticipated
47. See SC § 1, cmt. f.
48. Actual costs incurred are irrelevant to calculating anticipated surplus. Consider a case that
is the same as this illustration, except C makes a down payment of $1,000. Whether C has made a
down payment and the amount of any down payment are irrelevant to calculating the anticipated
revenue or anticipated surplus because they reflect benefits actually received. The definition in this
section does not refer to the time when the revenues are received or to what actual performance
occurred. Compare SC § 3, which refers to the calculation of actual surplus. If C had performed as
promised, A's revenue would have been $10,000 regardless of the timing of the payments.
49. See SC § 4.
2004]
17
Barnes and Zalesne: The Shadow Code
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
costs include both B's performance cost ($3,612) and
additional surplus-enhancing costs, such as additional
individualized monogramming needed to enhance the surplus
B would have obtained.5"
e. Anticipated Surplus, Overhead, and Fixed Costs
The computation of anticipated surplus reflects only revenues and variable costs
associated with the contract. Overhead or fixed costs, those the injured party would
have incurred even if it had not entered into the contract, are not included, because,
by definition, they were not increased by the breached agreement. A party pays the
overhead or fixed costs of its enterprise out of the surplus it obtains from the
complete performance of the contract by both parties. Complete performance
improves a party's well-being by contributing to both payment of those fixed
expenses that do not vary regardless of performance of the contract in question or
the party's wealth. Because the anticipated surplus calculated according to this rule
includes an amount that is available to contribute to the payment of overhead
expenses, overhead and fixed expenses may not be included with variable
performance and surplus-enhancing costs in the calculation of anticipated (or
actual) costs.
Illustration:
7. A, which manufacturers a wide variety of electronics systems
in its factory, contracts to sell B a transistor test system for
$10. When B breaches, A's anticipated costs do not include
such overhead expenses as the cost of factory maintenance,
insurance, and property taxes. These are expenses A would
have incurred regardless of whether A had contracted with B.
A's anticipated costs do include the variable performance cost
of raw materials used to build the transistor test system as
well as direct labor costs such as wages paid to testers,
shippers, and installers, to the extent those costs were
incurred in order to perform for B. If A's anticipated cost is
$8, its anticipated surplus would be $2. If the parties had
performed as promised, A could have used a portion of this $2
surplus to contribute to its overhead expenses. If B breaches
and A is awarded an amount equal to A's lost surplus ($2 per
system), A is thereby placed in the same position as if B had
performed because A may still use the same portion of this
amount to contribute to its overhead expenses.5
50. See, e.g., Furlong v. Alpha Chi Omega Sorority, 657 N.E.2d 866 (Bowling Green County
Mun. Ct. 1993). The buyer in this illustration is a consumer, but the same analysis applies to a business
enterprise. Consider a case where B contracts for $160,000 to buy from A, a custom-built houseboat
that A delivers in a defective condition. B's anticipated surplus is a monetized approximation of the
excess of benefits over costs associated with producing those benefits. B's status as a consumer or
business enterprise does not affect the approach to calculating B's damages, though it may affect how
B proves its losses. See Tarter v. MonArk Boat Co., 430 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
51. See Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 676 F.2d 865 (1st Cir. 1982). The term
"anticipated surplus" avoids the business-centered and often confused term "profit." In Unique Sys.,
Inc. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 622 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1980), A, a manufacturer of hair-spray systems, entered
into a contract to sell spray systems to B. B subsequently repudiated the contract, and A, without having
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f Anticipated Surplus, Breach of Warranty
In the event of a breach of warranty, the anticipated surplus is equal to the
revenue the injured party would have realized had the contract been fully performed
less the anticipated variable costs.
Illustration:
8. Pursuant to an express warranty, A contracts to sell "spring
wheat" seed to B for $10.00 per pound. B, in turn, intends to
sell the mature crop to a third party for $15.00 per pound. A
breaches the warranty and delivers to B "winter wheat" seed
that does not produce a harvestable crop. B's anticipated
surplus is the revenue that B would have received from its
contract with the third party ($15.00), less variable costs,
including the purchase price of the wheat seed as warranted
($10.00), which is a performance cost, and farning expenses
related to plantin§ and harvesting the crop, which are surplus-
enhancing costs.
C. Shadow Code § 3: Actual Surplus
An injured party's actual surplus is the difference
between the benefits that party received (actual revenue) and
cost that party incurred (actual cost) as a result of the parties'
performances under the contract or from substitute
performance arranged by the injured party.
1. Comments
a. Actual Surplus Defined
"Actual surplus" is the difference between actual revenue and actual cost. It is
a measure of the improvement in wealth or well-being the injured party obtained
from having contracted with the other person, considering both the costs and
benefits of having done so and incorporating the costs and benefits associated with
transactions arranged to substitute for the other's promised, but defective,
performance.
Illustrations:
1. A contracts to sell 12,000 yards of specially manufactured
fabric to B for $36,705. After A manufactures all the fabric
at a cost of $27,414, the market price drops, and B repudiates.
A is able to sell 7,000 yards from the order to a third party for
incurred any of the costs of manufacturing the systems, filed suit for damages. A recovered what the
court termed "gross profits," an amount that reflected the difference between the contract price and the
variable costs A would have incurred had B not repudiated. Under the surplus-based rules, this
difference is called the anticipated surplus and includes any residual over variable costs, because this
surplus would have been available to contribute to fixed-overhead expenses or for any other use.
52. See Albin Elevator Co. v. Pavlica, 649 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1982).
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$10,119, but is unable to sell the remaining 5,000 yards. A's
anticipated revenue is $36,705, and A's actual revenue from
resale is $10,119. Anticipated and actual costs were $27,414.
Lost surplus is the difference between anticipated surplus
($9,291) and actual surplus (-$17,295), and equals $26,586.J
2. B contracts for $3,612 to buy from A 168 custom designed
sweaters to be worn at a sorority function, the day after the
delivery date. B pays $2,000 in advance before A breaches.
If B's anticipated revenue is $8,000 (based on the benefits B
would have derived from having the 168 sweaters available
for the function) and B's anticipated cost is $3,612 (the
contract price), then B's anticipated surplus is $4,388. If
actual revenue was $0 and actual cost was the $2,000 down
payment, then actual surplus is -$2,000. Accordingly, lost
surplus is $6,388 ($4,388 minus -$2,000)."
b. Actual Revenue from Preparation to Receive or Deliver
Performance
Actual revenue is a measure of the total benefits obtained by a party due to
contracting with the other or arranging transactions to substitute for the other's
promised performance. Benefits may be derived from many sources, including the
injured party's preparation for the other's performance, such as by a seller's
manufacturing goods and holding them in preparation for delivery to the breaching
buyer or a buyer's preparations to receive goods from a breaching seller.
Illustrations:
3. B contracts to purchase twenty-six hog farrowing houses and
nurseries from A. B incurs installation costs preparing its
property for A's delivery of the huts. If B's preparation
makes the property ready for another seller's performance, it
creates a benefit to B and is included in actual revenue,
despite A's breach.55
4. A contracts to sell cumene to B. A purchases a large quantity
of benzene for use in manufacturing the cumene, but B
repudiates before A begins work. If the benzene will still yield
a benefit to A by use in another manufacturing process, that
53. See Foxco Indus., Ltd. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979).
54. See, e.g., Furlong v. Alpha Chi Omega Sorority, 657 N.E.2d 866 (Bowling Green County
Mun. Ct. 1993) (awarding aggrieved buyer the amount of the purchase price paid, and allowing buyer
to hold the sweaters until recovery of that payment, with no discussion of the benefit the buyer would
have obtained from the sweaters).
55. See Nachazel v. Miraco Mfg., 432 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 1988). For the lost surplus calculation,
see infra SC § 3, cmt. e, illus. 10.
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benefit is one that is associated with the contract and is
therefore included in actual revenue. 6
c. Actual Revenue from Partial or Defective Performance
Actual revenue includes the benefits derived by the injured party from the
breaching party's partial or defective performance and from the injured party's own
performance. For instance, when a breaching buyer makes a deposit or prepayment,
the injured seller's actual revenue includes the amounts of those payments. When
a breaching seller delivers less than promised under a contract, including an
installment contract, the buyer's benefit from the performance delivered is included
in actual revenue. Breach of warranty cases are also examples of defective
performance where the actual revenue is the benefit obtained from the goods
received.
Illustrations:
5. Before breaching, B makes a $4,250 deposit on a contract to
purchase a boat fromA. The contract price is $12,587.40. A
anticipated buying the boat from the manufacturer and
preparing it to supply to B for $10,008. When calculating
damages, the deposit of $4,250, a partial performance by B,
is actual revenue to A.
6. A contracts to sell B 1,300 tons of coal for $2.45 per ton. B
intends to resell for $4 per ton. A delivers 937 tons, and B
resells as intended. A refuses to deliver the remaining 363
tons. B's actual revenue is $3,748 ($4 times 937 tons). 
7. A contracts to sell a custom built houseboat under warranty to
B for $160,000. B takes delivery of the boat and discovers
56. See USX Corp. v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 753 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App. 1988). The same
analysis applies to resales and to installment sales contracts. Consider a case where A contracts to sell
B 2,000 raincoats at $40 each. B accepts and pays for 400 of the raincoats and subsequently breaches,
refusing to pay for or accept the remaining 1,600 raincoats. A's actual revenue is $16,000 ($40 times
400). The benefit A derives from those raincoats in resale or salvage is also actual revenue, as it is a
benefit received by the injured party as a result of the contract. See, e.g., Burberrys (Wholesale) Ltd.
v. After Six Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (addressing whether a proposed resale of the
raincoats not delivered to the buyer would be in good faith and commercially reasonable pursuant to
U.C.C. § 2-706 and trademark infringement rules). Consider also an installment sales case where B
contracts to purchase a fixed quantity of sugar from A in installments over three months. Each delivery
of sugar is to follow immediately upon A's receipt of shipping orders from B. A portion of the sugar
is delivered and paid for within the three month time period, but B stops sending shipping orders in the
middle of the contract, with remaining installments left unpaid. The total payments made by B are A's
actual revenue associated with the contract. The benefit to A of the sugar that A does not deliver is also
actual revenue to A, as it is a benefit received by the injured party as a result of the contract. If,
however, that sugar cannot reasonably provide any benefit to A (for instance because of a glut of sugar
on the market) no actual revenue is associated with that produced, but undelivered, sugar. See Great
W. Sugar Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 748 P.2d 1359 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). For the lost surplus
calculation, see infra SC § 3, cmt. e, illus. 11, n.66.
57. See Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972) (holding that foreseeable,
actual costs of storage and upkeep are added to damages). For the lost surplus calculation, see infra
SC § 3, cmt. i, illus. 25, n.68.
58. See Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Northy, 123 N.W. 47 (Mich. 1909).
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that it is deficient in numerous respects and does- not conform
to the warranty. B's actual revenue is $123,000, the benefit
obtained from receiving the boat in defective condition. That
actual revenue is the monetized approximation of the level of
satisfaction or well-being a consumer derives or the revenues
a commercial enterprise obtains from a boat in that defective
condition. 9
d. Actual Revenue from Substitute Transactions
Actual revenue includes the benefit to the injured party of any transactions the
injured party arranges to substitute for the promised performance. Examples
include benefits derived from cover and resale transactions.60 Where an injured
party declines to arrange a substitute transaction, that party may recover damages
based on a hypothetical reasonable transaction the injured party could have arranged
at a reasonable market price. In such cases, the market price is treated as actual
revenue for sellers and part of actual cost for buyers. In this hypothetical
transaction, the costs the injured party would have incurred are treated as actual
costs, and the revenues the injured party would have obtained are treated as actual
revenues.
6'
Illustrations:
8. B breaches a contract to purchase 1,000 tons of imported
European steel from A at $300 per ton. A resells the 1,000
tons of steel for $200 per ton. Subject to the rules regarding
lost volume sellers62 the $200,000 obtained from the resale is
actual revenue because it reflects the benefit of any
transactions the injured party arranged to substitute for the
promised performance. 3 If A elects not to resell, the market
price at which A could reasonably have resold the steel,
perhaps $200 per ton, would be treated as actual revenue.
9. A contracts to deliver 229,000 pounds of confection
sunflowers to B for $.1125 per pound. Because of severe
weed infestation and drought, A is unable to deliver the
sunflowers to B, who purchases replacements at a cost of $.26
per pound. B's actual revenue is the benefit B obtains from
the replacement goods?' If the buyer elects not to cover, the
market price at which the buyer could reasonably have
covered, presumably $.26 per pound, would be treated as
actual cost, and the benefit B would have obtained is treated
as actual revenue.
59. See Tarter v. MonArk Boat Co., 430 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
60. But see infra cmt. h, Actual Revenue, Lost Volume Seller.
61. See also infra SC § 3 cmt. g. For treatment of substitute transactions that are not reasonable,
see infra SC § 4, cmt. d.
62. See infra SC §3, cmt. h.
63. See Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 424 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Mich 1976). For the
last surplus calculation, see infra SC § 3, cmt. g, illus. 20.
64. See Red River Commodities, Inc. v. Eidsness, 459 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1990).
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e. Actual Cost Associated with Performance or Enhancing Surplus
Actual cost is a measure of the total burdens incurred by a party due to
contracting with the other. Burdens include the injured party's cost of preparing or
beginning to perform or performing in full as well as its surplus-enhancing costs.
The benefit from those expenditures is not relevant to the computation of actual
cost, but rather to the computation of actual revenue.
Illustrations:
10. As in Illustration 3, B incurs expenses of $4,591 before the
delivery date to prepare the property for farrowing houses
promised by A. When A breaches, B is entitled to recover
those expenses associated with preparing to receive the
other's performance even if B has not promised A that B
would incur those expenses, as they are surplus-enhancing
costs (actual costs associated with performance of the
contract) and are burdens to B. If B's anticipated revenue was
$100,000 and anticipated costs, including the contract price
of $50,000, the installation costs of $4,591, and other variable
costs of $25,409, totaled $80,000, then its anticipated surplus
would be $20,000. If B has not yet paid the contract price
and has incurred no costs aside from the installation expenses,
B's actual surplus is -$4,591 (actual revenue of $0 minus
actual cost of $4,591). B's lost surplus is $24,591 ($20,000
anticipated surplus minus -$4,591 actual surplus).65
11. A contracts to design and manufacture lawn mower grass
catcher bags for B. B breaches after A has purchased raw
materials but before A begins manufacturing the bags. The
costs of those materials purchased in preparation to deliver
performance are a burden to A and are thus included in actual
costs associated with performance of the contract, without
regard to whether the materials yield any benefit to A as
salvage. That benefit is relevant only to actual revenue. If
A's anticipated revenue was $241,000 (20,000 bags times
$12.05 per bag) and its anticipated costs were $213,600
(20,000 bags times $10.68 per bag), then A's anticipated
surplus is $27,400. If A has spent $18,442 at the time of
breach on raw materials, which have no other use and cannot
be resold, then A's actual revenue is $0 and actual costs are
$18,442, yielding an actual surplus of -$18,442. Accordingly,
A's lost surplus is $45,842 (anticip6ated surplus of $27,400
minus actual surplus of -$18,442).
65. See Nachazel v. Miraco Mfg., 432 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 1988).
66. See C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 641 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Miss. 1986). The same
logic applies to installment contracts. Consider a case where A refines a quantity of sugar in
preparation for delivery to B under an installment contract with B. B breaches after accepting delivery
of and paying for a portion of the quantity. The $375,000 A spent acquiring the raw materials and
refining both the delivered and the undelivered sugar for B is an actual cost. The cost of producing the
undelivered portion is an actual cost, because it was incurred in preparation of performance to B. The
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12. B contracts to buy 2,000 steers from A for $67 per steer and
makes a $50,000 down payment toward the purchase price of
$134,000. A delivers only 500 of the promised cattle. The
down payment is a cost B incurred as a result of contracting
with A and performing B's promise to A and is considered an
actual cost. The benefits B obtains from the delivered cattle
and would have obtained from the undelivered cattle are
irrelevant to the calculation of actual cost, though they are
relevant to calculating actual revenue and anticipated
revenue. B's anticipated revenue was $67.35 per steer,
totaling $134,700, yielding an anticipated surplus of $700
after subtracting anticipated costs of $134,000. B's actual
surplus is -$16,325, the difference between actual revenues
($33,675 = 500 times 67.35) and actual cost ($50,000). The
appropriate damages award is $700 minus -16,325, or
$17,025.7
13. Pursuant to a warranty, A contracts to sell a computer system
with specified capabilities to B for $46,020. B takes delivery
of the system and pays the contract price. B discovers that it
does not perform the specified functions as warranted. B's
actual cost of performing its contractual obligation is
$46,020. If B can obtain $7,000 in benefits from the
defective computer system for an expenditure of $5,000 in
labor to operate the system, that $7,000 measures B's actual
revenue. The actual surplus of -$44,020 ($7,000 minus
$5,000 minus $46,020) is compared to the anticipated
surplus, which would be the monetized value of any benefits
B would have obtained from the computer system if it had
performed as warranted less the costs (including the purchase
price and the cost of operating the system) of obtaining those
benefits.68
14. A contracts to sell 1,000 customized greeting card display
racks to B for $100,000. After A begins production, but
before completion, B breaches. A's production costs incurred
in partial performance of the contract are $15,000. These are
actual costs. Completing production would have cost an
additional $35,000 and would have produced a surplus of
cost of producing the delivered portion is an actual cost, because it was incurred in performance of the
promise to B. A's ability to resell the undelivered sugar to another is irrelevant to the computation of
actual cost, though relevant to the calculation of actual revenue. If A's anticipated revenue was
$414,000 (900,000 pounds times $.46 per pound) and A's anticipated costs were $375,000, then A's
anticipated surplus would be $39,000. If B had received and paid $170,890 for 371,500 pounds, and
the remaining sugar produced by A had no value, A's actual revenue would be $170,890. A's actual
surplus is -$204,110 ($170,890 minus $375,000). Accordingly, A's lost surplus would be $243,110
($39,000 minus -$204,110). See, e.g., Great W. Sugar Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 748 P.2d 1359,
1361 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (addressing whether efforts to resell the sugar would have been unavailing).
67. See, e.g., H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, 767 F.2d 437 (8th Cir.1985) (involving a contract
for the sale of 2,000 steers for $67 per hundredweight and a court award of $1,371.83 to the aggrieved
buyer for the lost resale commission for the 603 steers that were not delivered).
68. See Chatlos Sys. Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304, 1307 (3d Cir. 1982).
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$50,000. If there is no market or salvage value for the
unfinished goods, the actual revenues are zero. A's lost
surplus, $65,000, is the difference between anticipated
surplus of $50,000 and actual surplus of -$15,000 ($0 actual
revenue minus $15,000 actual cost). An award of $65,000
provides $15,000 to repay costs incurred plus $50,000 in
anticipated surplus.69
f Actual Cost Associated with Breach
Among the burdens imposed on the injured party by contracting with the other
are the actual costs the injured party would not have incurred had the other
performed as promised. Compare these costs to those costs associated with
performing and enhancing surplus, described in comment e. These breach-related
costs include: injury to person and property from defective performance;
foreseeable liability to third parties resulting from breach; charges, expenses, or
commissions incurred in stopping delivery; transportation, care, and custody of
goods after a buyer's breach; inspection, receipt, transportation, care, and custody
of goods rightfully rejected after a seller's breach; and costs incurred in connection
with reasonable attempts to minimize the losses associated with breach, such as
cover or resale, and including any commercially reasonable charges, expenses, or
commissions associated with those efforts. Costs incurred in fulfilling the
obligations of substitute transactions are discussed infra in comment g. The effect
of characterizing an injured seller as a lost volume seller is discussed infra in
comments h and i. Costs associated with breach do not include so-called
"opportunity costs," the revenues lost from failing to pursue another transaction in
lieu of the contract with the breaching party or from the inability, due to delay or
other reason, to pursue an additional opportunity. Revenues lost are accounted for
in the comparison of actual and anticipated revenues and are not relevant to actual
costs.
Illustrations:
15. B suffers personal injuries and harm to personal property
when the sports utility vehicle B purchases from A rolls over.
On a breach of warranty claim, B is entitled to compensation
for the costs imposed by A's breach. B did not anticipate
69. See Cesco Mfg. Corp. v. Norcross, Inc., 391 N.E.2d 270 (Mass. App. 1979). Projected costs
and surplus at the time of contracting are irrelevant to the actual cost. Again, consider the case where
A contracts to sell B 2,000 raincoats for $65 each. At the time of contracting, A's anticipated cost of
manufacturing the raincoats is $15 each and A projects a surplus of $100,000. By the time A begins
production, A's performance costs have risen to $45 per coat, leaving an anticipated surplus of only
$40,000 (2,000 times $20). A manufactured all 2,000 coats by the time B repudiates the contract;
therefore, A's actual performance cost is $90,000 ($45 times 2,000 raincoats). A disposes of the
raincoats as salvage for $16,000. A's lost surplus is $114,000, which is the difference between
anticipated surplus (the surplus A would have realized had B not breached), $40,000, and actual
surplus, -$74,000 ($16,000 minus $90,000). An award of $114,000 pays for actual costs ($90,000)
and leaves $24,000, which, together with the actual revenue of $16,000, improves A's well-being by
$40,000, as anticipated. The hoped-for, or projected, surplus based on costs at the time of contracting
are irrelevant. See, e.g., Burberrys (Wholesale) Ltd. v. After Six Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1984) (addressing whether a proposed resale of the raincoats not delivered to the buyer would be
in good faith and commercially reasonable pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-706 and trademark infringement
rules).
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incurring those costs when contracting with A and would not
have incurred those costs had A not breached. If B purchased
the car for $20,000 and expected to obtain $30,000 in benefits
from the car after incurring surplus-enhancing costs (for
example, gas and insurance) of $7,000, B's anticipated
surplus is $3,000. If B gets no benefit from the defective car,
incurs $2,000 in surplus-enhancing costs, and incurs
$1,195,000 in breach-related costs for personal injury and
property damage to the car, B's actual surplus is -$1,197,000,
yielding a lost surplus of $1.2 million.70
16. B purchases steel coils from A and, upon inspection,
discovers that they are defective. The coils require $10,000
in additional transportation and labor charges to repair. The
additional transportation and labor expenses are expenses B
would not have had to bear if A had performed as promised
and are therefore included as part of actual costs. If the
repaired goods have the same value to B as if the goods had
been delivered as promised, then B's anticipated and actual
revenue are equal, and B's lost surplus is $10,000, the
difference between the anticipated and actual costs.
7 1
17. B breaches a contract to purchase a boat from A for
$12,587.40. The boat is specially ordered and delivered by
the manufacturer to A. A incurs $674 in storage, upkeep,
financing, and insurance costs associated with having the boat
in A's possession until another customer is found in order to
mitigate its potential damages from B's breach. Because A
specially orders boats and would not, without B's breach,
have incurred those mitigation costs, they are actual costs
associated with B's breach.
72
18. A, a British antiques seller, is entitled to recover the cost of
transporting candelabras and a centerpiece from the United
States back to London after B, an American buyer,
improperly refuses to accept them. A's transportation cost, a
burden A would not have had to bear had B not breached, and
70. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E. 2d 730 (N.Y. 1995).
71. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chi. Metal Mfg., No. 84C7208, 1986 WL 1588 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 17, 1986) (refusing to award such incidental damages because they were excluded by the contract
terms). The same reasoning applies where delayed delivery imposes costs on the injured party.
Consider a case where B contracts to purchase window shutters from A, to be delivered by July 22. A
knows that B has contracted to install the shutters for C by August 4. A breaches the contract by
delivering the shutters late on July 28. B incurs $9,405 in overtime expenses to avoid breaching its
contract with C. The overtime charges are a reasonable attempt to minimize the costs associated with
A's breach and included as actual costs associated with A's breach. Where the contract price is
$45,328.62, if B's anticipated revenue from the contract is $50,000, B's anticipated surplus is
$4,671.38. If B is able to garner the same $50,000 benefit despite A's breach, incurring only the
additional $9,405 in overtime expenses, B's actual surplus is -$4,733.62 [actual revenue of $50,000
minus actual cost of $54,733.62 ($45,328.62 plus $9,405)]. Thus, B's lost surplus is $9,405
($4,671.38 minus -$4,733.62). See Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
72. See Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972). For the lost surplus
calculation, see infra SC § 3, cmt. i, illus. 25, n.80.
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is included as an actual cost. If the contract price of $45,000
was unpaid by B, and A's anticipated cost was $30,000, A's
anticipated surplus is $15,000. A's actual cost of transporting
the goods back to London is $499.85, yielding an actual
surplus of -$499.85. A's lost surplus is $15,499.85 ($15,000
minus -$499.85).
73
19. A contracts to sell B 1,000 pounds of sunflower seeds for $13
per hundredweight, $1,300 total, knowing that B is a reseller
of seeds. B has a contract to resell the seeds to C for the same
price, plus a $0.55 per hundredweight handling fee, $1,355
total. The market price rises to $26 per hundredweight, and
A breaches the contract with B. Thereafter, C buys seeds
directly from A at a negotiated price of $20 per
hundredweight, $2,000 total. B is still liable to C on their
contract. Because B is liable to C for breaching the resale
contract, the amount C paid for seeds in excess of their
contract price, $645, is included as an actual cost associated
with A's breach of A's contract with B when computing
damages for B's suit against A. B's anticipated surplus is $55
($1,355 minus $1,300), B's actual surplus is -$645 ($0 minus
$645), and B's lost surplus is $700 ($55 minus -$645). 74
g. Actual Cost Associated with Substitute Transaction
The cost to a party of arranging and fulfilling the obligations of a substitute
transaction in order to mitigate the losses associated with breach, as in cases of
cover and resale, are actual costs to be included in the calculation of actual surplus.
In cases of resale, the resale price is part of actual revenue, while additional
expenses are part of actual cost. In cases of cover, the cover price and the costs of
arranging cover are both part of actual cost. Where a party has performed in part
before breaching, that party may be entitled to a refund if the injured party arranges
a favorable substitute transaction. Where an injured party declines to arrange a
substitute transaction, that party may recover damages based on a hypothetical
73. See, e.g., N. Bloom & Son (Antiques) Ltd. v. Skelly, 673 F. Supp. 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(holding that buyer accepted the goods and that seller was entitled to the full contract price). The same
logic applies to other costs imposed on a seller because of the buyer's breach. Consider a case where,
having delivered fuel oil under a contract with B, A incurs a late fee from a financial institution, C,
when B fails to pay A the purchase price on the date due under the contract. Although A incurred this
cost from a transaction with C, a third party, it is nonetheless a cost incurred as a result of contracting
with the other. The fee was associated with the breach and would not have been incurred had B
performed as promised. Subject to the limitations on damages in SC § 4, the penalty is a component
of actual cost. Where the contract price was $865,415.16, and A expected to spend $800,000 on the
fuel, A's anticipated surplus was $65,415.16. Where B has paid $225,000 toward the purchase price,
A pays the $800,000 contract price in advance, and.A incurs a $25,000 penalty imposed as a result of
B's failure to pay on the date due, A's actual surplus is -$600,000 ($225,000 actual revenue minus
$825,000 actual costs), yielding a lost surplus of $665,415.16 ($65,415.16 minus -$600,000). See,
e.g., Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding such
costs incurred were consequential damages and thus not recoverable to an aggrieved seller under the
U.C.C. rule then in effect, and awarding seller $640,415.16 in lost revenues).
74. See, e.g., Tongish v. Thomas, 829 P.2d 916 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (remanding case so
damages could be awarded to buyer based on difference between market price and contract price,
despite fact that buyer had protected itself from market price fluctuations through contract with third
party).
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reasonable transaction it could have arranged at a reasonable market price. In such
cases, the market price is treated as actual revenue for sellers and part of actual cost
for buyers. In this hypothetical transaction, the cost the injured party would have
incurred had the other party performed is treated as actual cost, and the revenue the
injured party would have obtained had the other party performed is treated as actual
revenue.
75
Illustrations:
20. B enters a contract to purchase 1,000 tons of imported
European steel from A for $300 per ton. When B breaches,
A has incurred $100,000 to produce the steel. After B
breaches, A incurs $2,000 in storage and handling costs that
A would not otherwise have incurred. To ship the steel to a
new buyer, A incurs a cost of $5,000, an amount identical to
the anticipated cost of shipping to B. The $100,000
production cost is an actual cost associated with performing
for B. B's breach imposed $2,000 in storage and handling
costs and $5,000 in shipping costs. Both are actual costs
associated with arranging the substitute transaction (the resale
to the third party). A resells 1,000 tons of steel for $200 per
ton, obtaining $200,000 in actual revenue from the substitute
performance. A's anticipated surplus is $195,000 ($300,000
in anticipated revenue less $105,000 in anticipated costs).
A's actual surplus is $93,00 ($200,000 in actual revenue from
the resale less $107,000 in actual costs). The lost surplus is
$102,000, the difference between anticipated and actual
surplus. Having received $200,000 from the resale and
$102,000 in damages (a total of $302,000) and spent
$107,000 in actual costs, A is left with $195,000, an amount
that places A in the position A would have occupied had B
performed.76
21. If the seller in Illustration 20 does not resell, the market price
at which the seller could have resold, perhaps $200 per ton,
75. See also supra SC § 3 cmt. d.
76. See Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 424 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Mich. 1976). An
aggrieved seller may have actual revenue and actual cost from a variety of sources. The structure of
the surplus-based damages rule requires only identification of all of those sources of revenue and cost
that are associated with the breached contract. Consider a case where revenue was obtained from both
the breaching party and another buyer and where the seller incurred costs performing for both. In In
re Rooster, Inc., 127 B.R. 560 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991), B, the original buyer, breached a contract to buy
silk fabric from A. Assume that A spent $1,000 to store the fabric until it was resold (the actual amount
was somewhere between $1,000 and $2,000) and paid $10,000 for a new screen to prepare the fabric
to sell to C, a new buyer. Id. at 564. These reasonable additional expenses are recoverable as actual
costs of arranging a substitute transaction that is necessary only due to B's breach. Where B has paid
$22,137 toward the $44,274 purchase price in advance, but A is able to resell the goods to a third party
for the same price, A's actual revenue includes both the $44,274 from the second buyer and the $22,137
from the breaching party. A's actual cost includes the original cost of manufacturing the silk for
$30,000 plus the breach-related cost of $11,000, including remanufacturing for C. The actual surplus
of $25,411 ($66,411 minus $41,000) exceeds the anticipated surplus of $14,274 ($44,274 minus
$30,000) by $11,137. The lost surplus is a negative amount, -$11,137, indicating that the breaching
party is entitled to a return of that portion of its deposit.
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is treated as actual revenue to the extent that it is a reasonable
estimate of the price at which the seller could have resold.
The cost actually incurred to produce the steel, which is a
performance cost, and any reasonable cost to store and handle
the steel, which is a breach-related cost, are treated as actual
costs. Including the shipping cost in this case is
inappropriate, because the seller declined to resell. The
actual surplus, when treating the market price as actual
revenue ($200,000) and the performance and breach-related
costs as actual costs ($102,000), is $98,000. The lost surplus
is then the difference between the anticipated surplus,
$195,000, and the actual surplus of $98,000, which equals
$97,000. Having a stock of steel worth $200,000 and
damages of $97,000 (a total of $297,000) and having spent
$102,000 in actual costs, A is left with $195,000, an amount
sufficient to place A in the position A would have occupied
had B performed.
22. A breaches a contract to sell 400,000 extruded aluminum
blanks to B for $.145 each after providing 37,500 blanks. As
a result of A's partial breach, B covers by buying the
remaining 362,500 blanks from a third party for $.271 each.
In seeking the substitution goods, B incurs $1,159.94 in extra
freight costs because the new seller's plant is farther away.
The seller's breach imposed $1,159.94 in shipping costs that
are actual costs associated with arranging the substitute cover
transaction. Where B's anticipated and actual revenue are
equal and surplus-enhancing costs (using the blanks in some
manufacturing process, for instance) are unchanged, B's lost
surplus is $46,834.94. This lost surplus is the difference
between the $104,834.94 in actual costs other than surplus-
enhancing costs (37,500 blanks at $.145 per blank plus
362,500 blanks at $.271 per blank plus $1,159.94 freight
costs) and the $58,000 in anticipated costs other than surplus-
enhancing costs (400,000 times $.145). Having paid an extra
$45,675 for blanks and incurred extra freight costs of
$1,159.94 (totaling $46,834.94), a damage award of that
amount (the lost surplus) makes B whole."
77. See R.L. Pohlman Co. v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 399 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Mo. 1975)
(awarding smaller amount because of money owed to the seller). In many cover cases, the lost surplus
is simply the difference between anticipated and actual cost because anticipated and actual revenues
are equal. In re Fran Char Press, 55 B.R. 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985), for instance, involved a contract
for B to buy printed posters from A. B finds half of the posters produced are defective and discards
them. B hires a new printer at a cost of $30,590 to replace the defective posters and is entitled to
recover the full amount of the cover. The cover price is an actual cost associated with A's breach, the
cost of fulfilling the obligations of a substitute transaction. Since the anticipated and actual revenue
are equal, B's lost surplus is $30,590, the difference between the anticipated and actual costs. Consider
another case in which A contracted to deliver 229,000 pounds of sunflowers to B for $. 1125 per pound.
When A was unable to deliver the sunflowers, B purchased replacements at a cost of $.26 per pound.
B's lost surplus is the difference between anticipated surplus and actual surplus. Because B was able
to satisfy its requirements by cover, anticipated and actual revenues are equal. Accordingly, the
difference between anticipated surplus and actual surplus is equal to the difference between anticipated
cost and actual cost, which is -$33,205 ($26,335 minus $59,540). An award of $33,205 will place B
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23. In Illustration 22, if B does not cover, the market price at
which B could reasonably have covered, perhaps $.271 per
blank, totaling $98,237.50 (362,500 blanks at $.27 per blank),
and the other anticipated costs, excluding surplus-enhancing
costs, totaling $5,437.50 (37,500 blanks at $.145 per blank),
are treated as actual costs. The extra shipping costs are not
treated as actual costs in this example because, by hypothesis,
they did not occur. Where B's anticipated and actual revenue
are equal, and surplus-enhancing costs are unchanged, B's
lost surplus is the difference in costs treated as actually
incurred and anticipated costs. Here, the costs treated as
actually incurred include performance cost, $5,437.50, and
the market price for 362,500 blanks ($98,237.50), totaling
$103,675. Lost surplus of $45,675 is the difference between
anticipated performance cost, $58,000, and the actual
performance cost, $103, 675. Because anticipated and actual
revenues and anticipated and actual surplus-enhancing costs
are unchanged, B is made whole.
h. Actual Revenue, Lost Volume Seller
A lost volume seller is one whose willingness and ability to supply is, as a
practical matter, unlimited in comparison to the demand for the product. When,
upon the buyer's breach, the seller resells the good intended for the first buyer to a
second buyer, the remedial issue is whether that resale is a substitute transaction to
the original sale7" or a separate sale. The lost volume seller's claim is that the
transaction is not a substitute transaction, the actual revenue of which reduces the
damages award based on lost surplus. The seller's claim is that the sale is a separate
transaction that the seller would have arranged even if the buyer had not breached.
Because there is no "substitute" under this logic, the lost volume seller is permitted
to claim lost surplus unreduced by any surplus obtained on the turnaround sale.
Where the injured party is a lost volume seller who possesses capacity to make an
additional sale, would have profited from that additional sale, and the sale was
probable, the revenue from the additional sale is excluded from actual revenue.
Illustration:
24. As in Illustration 17, B contracts to buy a boat from A, a boat
retailer, for $12,587.40 and makes a down payment of
$4,250. A's anticipated and actual cost of acquiring the boat
from the manufacturer and supplying it to B was $10,008. B
breaches the contract. A sells the boat originally intended for
B to C, an additional consumer, for the same price. If A is a
lost volume seller, the revenue from the sale to C is excluded
from actual revenue in the calculation of lost surplus. Thus,
the actual revenue related to the contract with B is $4,250, not
$4,250 plus the resale price. It is incorrect to treat the price
in the position it would have occupied had A performed as promised. Red River Commodities, Inc. v.
Eidsness, 459 N.W. 2d 811 (N.D. 1990).
78. See infra § 3, cmts. d and g.
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for the resale of the boat as actual revenue if A would have
earned that revenue even if B had not breached. The revenue
is not actual revenue related to the contract because A is a
retailer and there is no practical limit on A's willingness or
capacity to sell boats. Without the breach, A would have sold
one more boat.79
i. Actual Cost, Lost Volume Seller
Where the injured party is a lost volume seller that made an addition sale, the
costs associated with fulfilling the obligations of the second sale are not included
as an actual cost of the original contract.
Illustrations:
25. B contracts to buy a plane from A for $20 million and pays a
deposit of $250,000. A would have earned a surplus of $1.8
million given full performance. However, B breaches, and A
sells a modified version of the same plane to C for $22
million, at a cost of $1,325 more to produce, thus yielding a
surplus of $1.9 million. A is a lost volume seller, because A's
factory was operating at 60% capacity during the relevant
time period and could have profitably accelerated its
production schedule to produce additional models of that
plane. Neither the revenue nor the cost associated with
fulfilling the contract with C is relevant to calculating
damages owed by B to A. The production costs, including the
modifications for C, are not costs associated with B's contract
where the modifications were not necessitated by the breach.
Where anticipated surplus is $1.8 million and actual surplus
is $250,000, lost surplus is $1,550,000.80
79. See Nei v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972). For the lost surplus
calculation, see infra SC § 3, cmt. i, illus. 25, n.80. To be a lost volume seller, the seller must be
willing and able profitably to satisfy additional demand. That is not always the case, even in
commercial contracts. For example, in Ragen Corp. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912 F.2d 619 (3d
Cir. 1990), B contracted to buy an automated computerized machining center from A. B then breached
the contract. A sold the machining center to C, a third party, for the same price. Where A has more
orders than it can fill and could not have supplied both B and C, A is not a lost volume seller. B's
cancellation did not harm A because it enabled A to sell machines to a buyer it was otherwise unable
to supply. Thus, the revenue from the sale to C is included as actual revenue and reduces A's recovery.
If there is no increase in cost to effect the resale, anticipated and actual revenues are equal, and
anticipated and actual costs are equal, so there are no damages.
80. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Learjet, Inc., 946 P.2d 1010 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming an award
of liquidated damages). Where the breaching buyer has made a down payment, a lost volume seller
might be required to return a portion of it, despite the fact that profits from the resale are not credited
to the breaching buyer. In Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972), A's cost of
selling the boat for $12,587.40 to B would have been the $10,008 wholesale price. B pays a deposit
of $4,250. After B breaches, A resells the boat to C for the same price. Despite having been originally
incurred in order to fulfill the contract with B, the $10,008 wholesale cost is not an actual cost under
the lost surplus calculation in A's suit against B, because they are costs ultimately associated with a
separate transaction. A also incurred $674 in storage, maintenance, insurance, and financing costs that
would not have been incurred had B not breached and which would not ordinarily be incurred in
completing the transaction for C. In A's suit against B, these breach-related costs are actual costs under
the lost surplus rule. A may recover damages, as calculated by the surplus-based rule, from B without
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26. B breaches a contract to purchase a machining center from A.
A is not a lost volume seller. Since the sale of the automated
computerized machining center to C is a substitute transaction
rather than an additional sale, A's costs of selling to C are
included in actual costs of performing for A, and the revenues
from selling to C are included in the actual revenues for A.
A's lost surplus is equal to any shortfall in actual revenue
compared to anticipated revenue and any increase in actual
costs over anticipated costs. Because A resold for the same
price, produced at the same cost, and incurred no other actual
costs, anticipated and actual surpluses are identical, and no
lost surplus arises.8
D. Shadow Code § 4: Losses Compensable
Losses are compensable only to the extent that:
(a) the injured party could not have avoided them using
reasonable methods;
(b) they are reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary
course of events or as a result of special circumstances
the parties had reason to know; and
(c) the fact of the loss and the amount of the loss are
provable with reasonable certainty.
1. Comments
a. Limits on Liability Generally
Lost surplus may result from a shortfall in actual compared to anticipated
revenue, actual cost in excess of anticipated cost, or a combination of both. Limits
on liability enumerated in this section apply to all sources of revenue and all types
of costs.
b. Avoidability
An injured party will not be compensated for loss that the party could have
avoided by making reasonable efforts appropriate to the circumstances.
c. Avoiding Lost Revenue
An injured party often can take many steps to avoid lost revenue. An injured
buyer frequently can cover by obtaining a suitable substitute on the market.
any consideration of the transaction with C. Anticipated surplus is anticipated revenue ($12,587.40)
less anticipated cost ($10,008), which in this case equals $2,579.40. Actual surplus is actual revenue
(the down payment of $4,250) less the actual cost ($0 performance cost, because that cost is associated
with the resale, plus the breach-related cost of $674), which equals $3,576 in this case. The total lost
surplus is anticipated surplus of $2,579 minus actual surplus of $3,576 which equals - $997. After
returning $997 of the down payment to the breaching buyer, the seller will have $3,576 from the down
payment to provide full compensation for the breach-related cost of $674 and the anticipated surplus
of $2,579.
81. See Ragen Corp. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1990).
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Similarly, an injured seller can often dispose of the goods that were to have been
delivered under the contract on the market. In some cases, an injured seller can
avoid some loss by salvaging and reallocating some or all of the resources that
otherwise would have been devoted to performance of the contract. Similarly, an
injured buyer, in some cases, can limit losses by using any salvageable goods where
the seller delivers non-conforming goods.
d. Avoiding Lost Revenue-Substitute Transactions
An injured party is not obliged to arrange a substitute transaction in order to
minimize its losses. However, when a party fails to arrange a substitute transaction,
even where a reasonable opportunity to do so is available, damages are based on a
hypothetical substitute transaction. In such cases, the market price at which a
substitute transaction could have been arranged may be used to estimate lost
surplus.82 If the injured party arranges a substitute transaction, actual revenues and
actual costs associated with the substitute transaction are used to calculate damages,
but only to the extent that the substitute transaction is reasonable.83
Illustrations:
1. A breaches a contract to sell a jet aircraft to B for $985,000 by
selling it to C, an unrelated third party. Where B has the
opportunity, on two occasions, to purchase the original
aircraft from C for $987,500, but instead buys a different but
comparable aircraft on the open market for $96,664 more
than the original contract price, such substitute purchase is
not reasonable cover. The market price of $987,500
(evidenced by the price at which C offered to sell the aircraft
to B), rather than the cover price, is treated as part of actual
costs, pursuant to SC § 3, cmt. g. Since B's anticipated and
actual revenue are the same, B's lost surplus is $2,500, the
difference between its reasonable actual costs ($987,500) and
anticipated costs ($985,000). Without this limitation on
damages, B's recovery would be $96,664. The limitation
reduces B's recovery to the surplus it could not reasonably
avoid losing, which is $2,500.84
82. See supra in SC § 3 cmts. d and g.
83. An aggrieved party may arrange a substitute transaction to avoid lost revenue, but may
recover losses only to the extent the substitute was a reasonable attempt to mitigate losses. For a
buyer's cover transaction to be reasonable, replacement goods need not be identical to the goods
identified in the contract, but they must be commercially usable as reasonable substitutes under the
circumstances of the particular case. In addition, the buyer must obtain the substitute in good faith, in
a reasonable manner, and without unreasonable delay. Commercial reasonableness of a buyer's delay
is determined by examining the surrounding nature, purpose, and circumstances of the underlying
transaction. To be reasonable, a seller's resale should be made as soon as practicable after breach, in
good faith, in a commercially reasonable manner, and at a commercially reasonable price. Commercial
reasonableness of a seller's delay depends upon the nature of the goods, the condition of the market,
and the other circumstances of the case. If no reasonable market exists at the time of breach, a delay
in resale may be proper.
84. See Scherman v. Kansas City Aviation Ctr, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12309 (D. Kan. Aug.
30, 1994). Where an aggrieved buyer does not have the resources to cover immediately following the
breach, a delay may be reasonable. Consider a case where B, a buyer, receives non-conforming goods
from A. Due to limited resources as a result of the transaction, B cannot immediately enter the market
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2. B breaches a contract to purchase a bulldozer for $9,825 from
A. A makes no effort to resell the bulldozer for more than a
year, during which time the market for bulldozers declines
due to a recession in the construction industry and high fuel
prices. A's resale for $7,230, in excess of fourteen months
after the breach, is commercially unreasonable because of its
slight probative value as an indication of the market price at
the time of the breach. If the market value of the bulldozer at
the time of breach was $9,200 and A incurred no actual costs
other than relinquishing the machine, damages are based on
the hypothetical reasonable transaction: a resale for $9,200.
Because the cost of the anticipated and (hypothetical) actual
transaction are the same, damages equal the difference
between the anticipated and actual revenues, which is $625
($9,825 minus $9,200).85
e. Avoiding Lost Revenue-Salvage
To mitigate revenue losses from another's breach, buyers and sellers may
sometimes use or salvage any part of the other's performance that was delivered or
any part of their own performance or surplus-enhancing expenditures. For example,
a seller aggrieved by a buyer's repudiation of unfinished goods may, in the exercise
of reasonable commercial judgment and in order to avoid loss, either complete the
manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the contract, or cease their
manufacture and resell them at their salvage value. In some cases, where a seller
delivers non-conforming goods, an injured buyer can limit losses by using or
reselling any salvageable goods. A party's failure to use or resell some salvageable
goods precludes recovery of damages to the extent reasonable salvage would have
prevented the loss.
and purchase substitute goods. As a result, B uses the non-conforming goods until cover can be
effected. B's delayed cover is reasonable. See Mobile Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Brown, 562 P.2d 1378
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). A delay may also be reasonable as a result of a limited or volatile market.
Suppose A breaches a contract to sell chipping potatoes in installments to B during the upcoming
shipping season. To effect cover, B purchases multiple lots over a thirty-eight day period in a rapidly
rising market. Where, because of a volatile market, no seller will commit to delivery at a later date, and
because of the perishable nature of potatoes, B cannot take delivery of all its potato needs at once, B's
delay of thirty-eight days is commercially reasonable. See Dangerfield v. Markel, 278 N.W.2d 364
(N.D. 1979).
85. See McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip. Co., 541 S.W.2d 911 (Ark. 1976). However,
where resale is not possible immediately following the breach, a delay may be reasonable. Consider
a case where B breaches a contract to purchase certain knitted fabric goods from A in October 1974.
A does not resell the goods identified to the contract until September 1975. Although the market price
of this material declined fifty percent from the time of the breach until September 1975, A's delay in
reselling the goods is reasonable, because the sale of A's spring fabric after the spring buying season
has ended is difficult. See Foxco Indus., Ltd. v. Fabric World, Inc., 595 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979). A
delay of many years may, indeed, be reasonable in some cases. Suppose B breaches a contract to
purchase certain machines from A. A does not resell the goods identified in the contract until three
years after the breach. A's delay in reselling the goods is reasonable where, after the breach, there is
no market for custom-ordered machines costing over $30,000 that have a very specialized use and
where A makes a continuing good faith effort to locate other purchasers. See Firwood Mfg. Co. v. Gen.
Tire, Inc., 96 F.3d 163 (6th Cir. 1996).
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Illustrations:
3. A contracts to sell cumene to B for $2,100,000. A purchases
10 million pounds of benzene for $. 10 per pound for use in
manufacturing the cumene. B repudiates the contract before
A begins work. A is able to use the pre-purchased benzene in
a manufacturing process for a subsequent contract to sell
cumene to C. As a result of changes in market conditions, the
market price for benzene has dropped, and, as a result, the
contract price with C is $500,000 lower than the contract
price with B. The $1 million spent on the benzene is actual
cost, and the $1,600,000 from sale of benzene to C is actual
revenue. If A expected to obtain a $2,100,000 benefit from
the contract with B by incurring $1.5 million in costs
(including $1 million for the benzene), A's anticipated surplus
is $600,000 ($2,100,000 minus $1,500,000). A's actual
surplus is $100,000 ($1,600,000 minus $1,500,000).
Accordingly, A's lost surplus is $500,000 ($600,000
anticipated surplus minus $100,000 actual surplus).,6
4. A breaches a contract to sell a car to B for $1,300 by
supplying a defective car. B resells the car for $600, which
is reasonable salvage given A's refusal to cure the defect.
The $600 is actual revenue in the lost surplus calculation. If
B anticipated obtaining $10,000 in benefit from the car by
incurring $2,000 in surplus-enhancing expenses, B's
anticipated surplus is $6,700 ($10,000 minus $1,300 minus
$2,000). B's actual surplus was -$700 ($600 minus $1,300).
B is entitled to recover $7,400 of lost surplus ($6,700 minus
-$700). Had B unreasonably failed to resell in order to realize
the salvage value, B's actual surplus would be -$1,300, and,
without this limitation on damages, B's recovery would be
$8,000 ($6,700 minus -$1,300). The limitation, however,
reduced B's recovery to the surplus it could not reasonably
avoid losing, which is $7,400.8
86. See, e.g., USX Corp. v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 753 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding the
decline in value of benzene was a consequential damage not available to sellers under the U.C.C. rule
then in effect, and that the seller could not recover the expense of the benzene that it would have
incurred regardless of buyer's breach).
87. See Woods v. Secord, 444 A.2d 539 (N.H. 1982). Such failure to resell salvageable goods
occurred in Borman 's, Inc. v. Olympic Mills, Inc., 91 Civ. 4244 (LJF), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7332
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1993). In that case, a seller entered into a contract to sell 800 cases of solid-colored
hand towels to a chain of supermarkets that planned to resell the hand towels. The seller breached by
delivering hand towels with patterns. Although the buyer could have reduced its damages by selling
the patterned towels in its stores, it did not do so. The buyer, prior to the breach, rented space to store
the goods. Such a buyer is entitled to recover the rental costs incurred only until the time that failure
to resell the salvageable goods becomes unreasonable. See id. Where salvage is not possible, full
recovery will be awarded. Consider, for example, a case where A breaches a contract to sell a mobile
home to B by supplying a mobile home with a leaking roof. Where B claims the mobile home is
unhabitable, the failure to attempt salvage by selling or renting to another does not prevent full
compensation. See, e.g., Vreeman v. Davis, 348 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 1984) (awarding return of
purchase price and remanding for evidence on valuation).
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f Avoiding Anticipated Costs
Once a party has reason to know that the other's return performance will not be
forthcoming, the former cannot recover for costs that result from an unreasonable
failure to stop performance.
Illustrations:
5. A enters a contract to sell airplane parts to B. Based on that
contract, B advertises the parts for resale. After A breaches,
B does not make reasonable effort to cancel the advertising.
B is not entitled to the cost of advertising or damages for loss
of goodwill incurred after becoming aware that A did not
intend to perform, because B could have reasonably avoided
such damages. B may still, however, recover the surplus lost
by its inability to resell the parts, if such loss is reasonably
foreseeable and can be calculated with reasonable certainty.
6. B breaches a contract to buy 3,000 photocopiers from A. A
fails to terminate a purchase order with its supplier of
components used to produce the goods for the contract with
B, which A could reasonably have done. A is not entitled to
the cost of those components.8 9
g. Avoiding Breach-Related Costs
Once a party has reason to know that the other's return performance will not be
forthcoming, the former cannot recover for out-of-pocket breach-related expenses
that reasonably could have been avoided.
Illustration:
7. B breaches a contract with A by refusing to purchase a car for
$2,000. A is able to resell the car at the same price to another
buyer, but instead opts to advertise in hopes of receiving a
higher price. A is not entitled to advertising costs of $40.
Because A could have received the same benefit in a
hypothetical resale transaction and incurred no additional
recoverable costs, A has no recoverable damages. 90
h. Unforeseeability
In order to be recoverable, losses for breach of contract must have been
reasonably foreseeable at the time of contract formation. The injured party need not
prove that the parties had specifically contemplated that the damages might result
or that the breaching party explicitly assumed the risk of such damages. The injured
88. See Selig v. Wunderlich Contracting Co., 69 N.W.2d 861 (Neb. 1955).
89. See, e.g., Copymate Mktg., Ltd. v. Modem Merch., Inc., 660 P.2d 332 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that seller acted in a commercially reasonable manner when, upon buyer's repudiation, it
terminated its purchase order with its supplier).
90. See Smith v. Joseph, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1560 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1981).
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party need only show that the damages ordinarily follow a breach of the contract in
the usual course of events, or that a reasonable person would have foreseen them
as a probable result of the breach.
i. Unforeseeable Lost Revenue
If, as a result of the other party's breach, a party is deprived of a surplus
associated with a larger project that would not be a foreseeable result of the breach,
that party is not entitled to recover such lost surplus.
Illustrations:
8. B contracts to purchase from A one tank car of prime tallow
for the purpose of processing it and making triple pressed
stearic acid. A erroneously delivers tallow adulterated with
hydrogenated fat, which precludes B from obtaining triple
pressed stearic acid. B is not entitled to the surplus
(associated with its larger project) lost as a result of A's
breach, where A had no knowledge of the specific intended
use of the particular material. 9'
9. A enters a contract to sell airplane components to B, which B
wrongfully terminates. The termination caused other parts
buyers, C and D, to stop negotiating with A. A seeks
recovery, inter alia, of lost surplus from the contract with B,
lost surplus on parts A would later sell to B to maintain the
components, and lost surplus on the contracts with C and D,
for which negotiations were stopped. If sufficient evidence
shows that the lost surplus on the contract with B and on
future contracts for sales of parts to B was foreseeable, such
damages are recoverable. Damages for the loss of the third
party contracts, however, are unforeseeable, and thus not
recoverable, where there was no indication that B knew or
had reason to know that its breach could lead to A's loss of
91. See W.C. Hardesty Co. v. Schaefer, 139 S.W.2d 1031 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940). Lost surplus
associated with a larger project is recoverable where the seller has actual knowledge of the intended
use of the goods. Consider, for example, a case where B enters a contract to purchase rough lumber
from A for the purpose of finishing it and reselling it. A fails to deliver the agreed amount of timber,
and B is unable to cover. Where A has knowledge that B is an established dealer in finished lumber,
B's lost revenue associated with its larger project is reasonably foreseeable and recoverable. See
Jennings v. Lamb, 296 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. 1956). Consider also a case where A contracts to sell a tract
of timber to B. After a delay, B repudiates. Where A specified its need to complete harvesting
promptly in order to meet a scheduled logging commitment to another buyer, C, the loss A incurred as
a result of A's delay in performing the contract with C is reasonably foreseeable, and therefore,
recoverable. See, e.g., Sprague v. Sumitomo Forestry Co., 709 P.2d 1200 (Wash. 1985) (holding that
the loss incurred from the delay was a consequential damage and thus not recoverable to an aggrieved
seller under the U.C.C. rule then in effect). Revenue lost as a result of the breach may also be
foreseeable where the use of the goods is apparent from the very nature of the buyer's business.
Consider, for example, a case where A, a seller, breaches a contract to deliver gas to B, a gas station
owner. B may claim secondary damages for lost sales at the mini-mart, because those losses are
foreseeable. Because mini-mart customers are primarily gasoline customers, it is reasonably
foreseeable that, if gasoline sales dropped dramatically, there would be a ripple effect on mini-mart
sales. See AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. At. Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990).
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those contracts. 92 A's damages are limited to lost surplus
from contracts with B.
j. Unforeseeable Anticipated Costs
A breaching party is not liable for performance or surplus-enhancing costs
incurred by the other if the losses associated with those expenditures were not, at
the time of contracting, reasonably foreseeable results of the breach.
Illustrations:
10. B contracts to purchase certain steel dies from A to be used in
the manufacture of lanterns. Prior to breach, B incurs
surplus-enhancing costs by hiring employees and providing
for their lodging. A breaches, and B seeks damages. B may
not recover the costs associated with idle employees or their
lodging, since such costs could not have been contemplated
as the natural and proximate consequence of a breach of
contract. Actual costs used in the calculation of B's lost
surplus do not include these surplus-enhancing costs.93
11. A, a seller, borrows money in order to purchase specific raw
material necessary for the production of a product it contracts
to sell to B. B breaches. A is not entitled to recover interest
on the borrowed money, because the interest was not a cost
that B could reasonably have foreseen. In calculating lost
surplus, A's actual costs are limited to freight charges A had
to bear in order to resell the goods, costs of re-advertising the
goods, and inspection and certification costs relating to resale
of the goods to a third party.94
k. Unforeseeable Breach-Related Costs
If a party incurs costs that would not have been incurred had the other
performed as promised, and, at the time of contracting, the breaching party did not
have reason to foresee such costs as a probable result of the breach, the injured
party is not entitled to recover such costs incurred.
Illustrations:
12. A breaches the title warranty in its contract with B when A
delivers a truck with multiple vehicle identification numbers.
Law enforcement officers subsequently impound the truck.
In the calculation of lost surplus, the costs of towing the truck
from the impoundment lot (the truck was inoperable due to
damages while in control of the highway patrol) are included
92. See Rogerson Aircraft Corp. v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1494 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
93. See Rochester Lantern Co. v. Stiles & Parker Press Co., 31 N.E. 1018 (N.Y. 1892).
94. See Afram Exp. Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 592 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Wis. 1984)
(finding such interest payments were an ongoing cost of doing business and not included in an award
as incidental damages).
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in actual costs, since such costs were reasonably foreseeable.
However, the high cost of storing the truck until B had the
finances to repair the damage caused while impounded is
excluded from actual costs, since the causal link between the
breach and the damages had become so attenuated that such
costs were unexpected and therefore unforeseeable.95
13. B breaches a contract to purchase crushed car bodies from A
for $14,065. After the breach, A resells the car bodies to a
third party for $9,080, incurring $600 in expenses, and also
incurring $2,200 in costs resulting from vandalism to
equipment used to load the crushed cars. A is entitled to
recover the expenses in arranging for resale, since such
expenses are reasonably foreseeable. A is not entitled to the
vandalism damage, since such vandalism was unforeseeable
by either party and did not stem from circumstances which
were reasonably contemplated by B at the time the agreement
was made. If A's anticipated cost was $10,000, then its
anticipated surplus is $4,065 ($14,065 anticipated revenue
minus $10,000 anticipated costs) and its actual surplus is -
$1,520 ($9,080 actual revenue minus $10,600 actual costs).
The breach-related costs associated with the vandalism are
not included as an actual cost in the lost surplus calculation.
Accordingly, A's lost surplus is $5,585.96
L Uncertainty
Damages must be calculable with a reasonable degree of certainty and
specificity, but need not be calculable with mathematical precision. Claimed losses
must not be too speculative in either their existence or amount.
Illustrations:
14. A breaches a contract authorizing B to enter and remove from
A's lot certain trees that B plans to resell as saw timber and
firewood. B is not entitled to recover lost revenue where B
cannot establish the amount lost with reasonable certainty,
even though B produces reasonably certain proof that it lost
95. See Colton v. Decker, 540 N.W.2d 172 (S.D. 1995). Breach-related costs are recoverable
where they can be expected to flow naturally from the breach as a result of the nature of the goods being
sold or the expected use to which they will be put. For example, A breaches a contract to sell
computerized cash registers to B, a chain of women's clothing stores, by delivering registers which are
not compatible with B's existing equipment. Where the failure of the cash registers to communicate
with B's computers would foreseeably create additional labor costs for the afflicted retail merchant,
such costs are recoverable. See Cricket Alley Corp. v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 732 P.2d 719 (Kan.
1987). Where, however, the costs incurred would not naturally be expected to flow from the breach,
such costs are not recoverable. Consider a case where A's delivery of a defective mobile home to B in
violation of their contract results in exposure to rain and freezing of pipes during cold spells. Damages
for aggravation ofB's pre-existing heart condition, pain and suffering, and emotional distress could not
have been reasonably foreseen by the parties at the time of contracting and are, therefore, not
recoverable. See Burnell v. Morning Star Homes, Inc., 494 N.Y.S.2d 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
96. See Carl Weissman & Sons, Inc. v. Pepper, 480 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Mont. 1979).
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revenue as a result of the breach. Accordingly, absent
evidence of any additional costs incurred, B is not entitled to
any damages, because B cannot establish anticipated surplus
with sufficient certainty. There being no provable anticipated
surplus and no actual surplus, there is no provable lost
surplus.97
m. Uncertain Lost Revenue
Problems of proof typically arise when the injured party is a buyer who cannot
cover or a seller who cannot resell, making damages depend on loss of surplus in
collateral transactions that have been disrupted by the breach. While showing a
history of past profitability is one method of establishing revenue loss with
reasonable certainty, lost revenue may also be recovered by new businesses for
breach of a sales contract if it can be proved with reasonable certainty. The
evidence necessary to establish lost revenue with reasonable certainty will depend
on the circumstances of the particular case. Loss of goodwill, as a type of
anticipated revenue, must also be proved with reasonable certainty.
Illustrations:
15. A breaches a contract to deliver goods to B, who owns a new
business. B alleges lost surplus because of the breach. A
challenges these damages, because B recently entered this
new line of business. B can only recover lost surplus by
proving the existence and amount of anticipated surplus with
reasonable certainty. B's failure to prove a previous pattern
of actual surpluses precludes recovery. Proof is insufficient
as to either the existence or the amount of anticipated surplus.
In the lost surplus calculation, no demonstrable difference
exists between anticipated and actual revenue. If B has
incurred no costs associated with A's performance, B has no
actual surplus and, therefore, no provable lost surplus. If B
has incurred costs associated with B's contract with A and can
prove them with reasonable certainty, those actual costs are
recoverable because B can prove a negative amount of actual
surplus equal to those costs.
9s
97. See, e.g., Fitz v. Coutinho, 622 A.2d 1220 (N.H. 1993) (remanding for an assessment of
nominal damages). Lost revenue is similarly not recoverable where a party cannot prove that the breach
was the cause of the loss. For example, A contracts to supply B with a quantity of masterbatch, a
primary ingredient of retread rubber manufactured and sold by B. A breaches when it is unable to
produce the required quantity of masterbatch because of a shortage of raw materials. B cannot prove
the fact of lost revenue due to the breach with sufficient certainty to permit recovery, because a number
of principal raw materials other than masterbatch needed to produce tread rubber were also in short
supply. See B.B. Walker Co. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 474 F. Supp. 651 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
98. See Jewell-Rung Agency, Inc. v. Haddad Org., 814 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In some
cases, a new business may have sufficient evidence of lost revenue, in which case such losses are
recoverable. Consider a case where A breaches a contract to sell airplane parts to B. Despite the fact
thatB's division responsible for the production of the parts is a new venture, B is entitled to recover lost
surplus where B offers detailed evidence as to the projected cost per unit to manufacture parts and as
to B's historical profit margin on the aircraft parts contracts of its other divisions. This provides a
sufficiently certain basis for calculating lost surplus. See Rogerson Aircraft Corp. v. Fairchild Indus.,
Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1494 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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16. B, the owner of a fish ranch, enters a contract to purchase fish
from A. A breaches by delivering diseased fish. Forced to
destroy all the fish at its ranch as a result of the diseased fish
in the shipment from A, B claims its customer base is
decimated. B offers no evidence that the enterprise is
profitable and insufficient evidence to estimate the value of
goodwill lost as a result of the breach. The sole evidence
advanced is testimony that plaintiff's customers became
afraid to buy fish from the plaintiff because of the outbreak of
the disease and that B's customer base fell drastically as a
result. B's damages would otherwise be the difference
between anticipated and actual surplus, but because B does
not prove anticipated surplus with sufficient certainty, B's
recovery is limited to its actual surplus, which is equal to
actual costs.99
n. Uncertain Anticipated Costs
If, at the time of the other party's breach, a party has incurred performance or
surplus-enhancing costs that can not be calculated with reasonable certainty, that
party is not entitled to recover such incurred costs.
o. Uncertain Breach-Related Costs
If a party incurs costs that would not have been incurred had the other
performed as promised, but those costs cannot be calculated with reasonable
certainty, the injured party is not entitled to recover those actual costs.
Illustration:
17. A breaches a contract to sell an Angus bull to B by delivering
a bull that is sterile. As a result, 38 of B's cows do not
become pregnant with calves from that bull, though they
become pregnant later in the year from other bulls. The delay
in pregnancy means that the calves are bom later in the year
and will be weaned later in the year. The consequence is that
these cows will be delivering calves outside of the normal
schedule for some years into the future, and their calves,
which would normally have been sold immediately after
weaning, will have to be fed through the winter, at some
unanticipated cost to B. This breach-related cost is neither
recoverable nor included among actual costs, because B
cannot establish with reasonable certainty either how many of
99. See Roundhouse v. Owens -Illinois, Inc., 604 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1979). Damages for loss of
goodwill are also unrecoverable if their existence can not be proved with reasonable certainty. For
example, B enters a contract to purchase scuba regulator hoses from A. After incorporating the
regulator hoses into its products, B discovers the hoses are defective and conducts a product recall.
Where B's business is new, B is not entitled to damages for the loss of goodwill caused by A's breach,
because the existence of such loss of potential customers is too speculative. See, e.g., Dacor Corp. v.
Sierra Precision, 753 F. Supp. 731 (N.D. Il. 1991) (holding that loss of goodwill is never compensable
in a contract action under Illinois law).
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the cows will continue to deliver outside the normal schedule,
or how many calves will actually have to be fed through the
winter. Accordingly, these breach-related costs are not
included among actual costs when computing lost surplus."°
100. See Hanes v. Twin Gable Farm, Inc., 714 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. App. Ct. 1986).
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